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A.  JUSTIFICATION OF THE TOPIC 
With the collapse of the Communist regime and disintegration of the Socialist 
Federative Republic Yugoslavia in the beginning of the 1990’s, drastic changes have 
taken place in the security realm in South Eastern Europe.  New countries have emerged 
and borders established in the aftermath of World War II have been redrawn.  This 
process has been accompanied by a significant increase in nationalism, violence, and 
inter-ethnic hatred.  Consequently, the region became an arena for several brutal armed 
conflicts in the 1990’s.  Ethnic cleansings, an uncontrolled flow of refugees, and 
collapses of belligerent’s economies have had significant impact not only on stability in 
the Balkan region but also on the overall security situation in Europe.  In this context, the 
1998-99 crisis in Kosovo, to which this study is devoted, is especially important.  
Five years have passed since in June 1999, the United Nations Security Council 
adopted Resolution 1244, which brought international administration under the auspices 
of the United Nations (UN) and established the United Nations Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK) and international military presence (KFOR).  Although significant steps were 
made in establishing a secure environment, promoting peace and inter-ethnic tolerance, 
creating a basis for substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, the overall 
political solution, which will satisfy all participants of the former conflict, still has not 
been determined.  Given that the crisis in Kosovo already had a spillover effect on the 
situation in Macedonia, Albania and destabilized southern regions of Presevo and 
Medevedja in Serbian proper, the unsolved problem of Kosovo poses a potential threat to 
security and stability in Europe. How will Greece, with its own Albanian minority, and 
Bulgaria, sensitive to the situation in Macedonia, react if conditions there will continue to 
deteriorate?  This problem will become even more vital with the accession of Hungary in 
2004, and Romania and Bulgaria in 2007 to the European Union.  With the possible 
1 
disintegration of the federative state of Serbia and Montenegro1, the latter may encounter 
problems with its own Albanian minority.  More likely is that without the military might 
of the Serbian and Montenegrin Armed Forces (SMAF)2 that are still under unconditional 
control exercised by Belgrade’s authorities, Montenegrin leadership might employ 
nationalism to suppress the Albanian minority. 
Ethnic and religious divisions are not unique to the former Yugoslavia.  Similar 
situations can be observed in many regions of the world without resulting in ethnic 
cleansing or civil war.  In numerous contemporary studies, a tendency exists to blame the 
Serbs for the outbreak of violence.  Nevertheless, as Warren Zimmermann, former U.S. 
Ambassador to Yugoslavia points out, “nothing in their genes makes Serbs irrational or 
inhuman or ‘Balkan’”3.  Neither Kosovo Albanians nor Serbs are wrong in their demands 
or are more responsible for the outbreak of violence.  Since there is no “right” or “wrong” 
side in inter-ethnic conflict, victims can be found on both sides.  
Both ethnic groups, Kosovo Albanians and Serbs, have legitimate claims to the 
territory of the province.  Both may not be fully deprived of their right to self-
determination and participation in determining the future status of the province.  The 
international community assumed the role of mediator and is facilitating the process of 
rebuilding civil society based on democratic principles.  This is a long and difficult task 
that raises several significant issues.  The most important is the future status of Kosovo.  
Given that the conflict already has a spillover effect on adjacent countries, the rhetoric 
about “democratic standards before status” and postponing the final settlement could 
challenge peace and stability not only in the region and beyond.  Therefore, the 
international community has a strong need to establish a feasible policy for the final 
                                                 
1 The now Union of Serbia and Montenegro is formerly known as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia consisting 
of the Republic of Serbia, including Serbia itself and the provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo, and the Republic of 
Montenegro. The agreement on the principles of relations between Serbia and Montenegro within the framework of a 
Union of States was signed by the President of the Federative Republic Yugoslavia Vojislav Kostunica, the Federal 
Deputy Prime Minister Miroljub Labus, the President of the Republic of Montenegro Milo Djukanovic, the Prime 
Ministers of Serbia and Montenegro Zoran Djindjic and Filip Vujanovic accordingly, on March 14, 2002. 
2 The official name of the Yugoslav Army, formerly known as Vojska Jugoslavije (VJ), was changed in the 
Serbian and Montenegrin Armed Forces after the agreement on principles of relations between Serbia and Montenegro 
within the framework of a Union of States was signed. 
3 Frank P. Harvey, Ethnic Conflict and Third-Party Intervention: Evaluating NATO’S Use of Coercive Diplomacy 
in Managing Protracted Intrastate Crises in Bosnia and Kosovo, [http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/99-01/Harvey.pdf] 
accessed on July 28, 2003. 
2 
settlement and be determined in its facilitation.  Only extensive knowledge of the region, 
its history and roots of the conflict will help the international community to avoid the 
pitfall of taking one side or another that can undermine the entire process of the conflict 
resolution.   
Not until the summer of 1998, when the outbreak of violence between ethnic 
Albanian guerrillas and Serbian authorities took place in the former Autonomous 
Province of Kosovo and the NATO military intervention against Serbia in March 1999, 
the region gained significant attention in the international media and was one of the main 
topics on the agenda of leading politicians in the United States, Europe, and Russia.  
Until that time, Kosovo was an insignificant subject for scholarly research, and the 
conflict between the Serbs and Kosovo Albanians caught politicians, academia, and the 
international public virtually unprepared and poorly informed.  Since then, a growing 
array of academic publications have been dedicated to the history of the region, origins of 
the conflict, and its possible outcomes.   
Many authors, in their attempts to explain the origins of the modern conflict in 
Kosovo, argue that the population of the province has always been exposed to so-called 
“ancient ethnic hatreds”.  “Others argue that today's strains are artificial, manufactured by 
cynical postcommunist demagogues looking to legitimate their rule.”4  Neither school is 
absolutely right.  In addition, different authors identify different times as a starting point 
of the conflict.  The most commonly accepted view is that the conflict started at the 
beginning of the 1990’s as a reaction of the Kosovo Albanians to the abolition of 
autonomy by the former President Slobodan Milosevic.  However, the problem in 
Kosovo, evolving for centuries, and which eventually caused bloody interethnic conflict 
with substantial involvement of outside powers, is more complex in its origins.  The 
reasons that led to the present state of affairs are more profound, and deserve more 
sophisticated explanations than the ones just mentioned.   
This study argues that the root cause of the modern conflict in Kosovo is a 
combination of several factors that gained significant influence as a result of sudden 
changes associated with the emergence of a new post-Cold War international system.  
                                                 
4 William Hagen, “The Balkans' Lethal Nationalisms,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 4, July 1999, 
[http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/hagan.htm] accessed on May 24, 2003. 
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Mutual animosity, resentment, and fear of domination by other ethnic groups, are the 
result of a steady accumulated grievance and historical experience of protracted conflict.  
The present situation in Kosovo became possible not only because of a considerable 
increase in ethnic nationalism exploited by the leaders of different communities during 
the last decade of the 20th century, but also because of the manipulation of the national 
aspiration of peoples throughout the history of Serbia and Montenegro.  The modern 
conflict derived from the failure of two peoples to create a society based on co-operation 
and peaceful co-existence.  The poor performance of the economy during the rule of 
Communism, the weakness of the federal government, caused by the numerous 
amendments to the Constitution made by Tito in an endeavor to suppress the looming 
danger of ethnic nationalism, only aggravated the state of affairs and eventually led to the 
bloody interethnic conflict.  
B.  THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the history of relations between the Serbs 
and Albanians in Kosovo during a relatively broad period of time, starting with the 
demise of the Ottoman Empire to present.  Another goal it to explore the origins of the 
modern conflict, and to identify and examine the decisive factors that influenced the 
development of the contradicting positions of two peoples that eventually led to open 
hostilities.  The study employs a descriptive approach and is based on a single case study.  
It reviews and examines contemporary scholarly literature dedicated to the subject.  As 
primary sources, it employs books and reports on the topic, various governmental and 
international organizations’ official documents, and the personal insights of the author.  
The main focus of the study is the history of relations between then Serbs and Albanians 
with an emphasis on nationalism. 
The study is organized into five chapters.  Chapter I, as an introduction, provides 
the justification for this topic, and discusses how the thesis is organized.   
Chapter II presents a historical background of the major events that influenced 
and shaped relations between the Serbs and Albanians starting with the demise of the 
Ottoman Empire until the end of World War II.  It analyzes the origins, roots, and causes  
4 
of the ethnic and political conflict in Kosovo. It identifies how two contradicting 
positions of conflicting ethnic groups were established, and briefly describes the 
influence of external powers as well.   
Chapter III analyzes the so-called Albanian movement. Was it a genuine 
movement for the rights of a national “minority” oppressed by the “majority” or an 
attempt to gain more concessions from the central government in order to obtain a better 
position among other nationalities in the region?   
Chapter IV investigates how activities of the Kosovo Albanians triggered a 
backlash of Serbian nationalism that had been suppressed during the rule of Communism.  
It examines the process of the division of society along ethnic, cultural, religious lines 
that eventually made the seizure of power possible by nationalistic conservatives.  It will 
speculate why nothing was done to diffuse the situation before radical militants formed 
clandestine terrorist units that started open rebellion.   
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II. THE SURPLUS OF HISTORY AND MYTHS 
There is no present or future - only the past happening over and over again 
- now. 
- Eugene O’Neill 
A. BETWEEN SERBS AND ALBANIANS 
Starting with the advancement of the Ottoman Turks deep into the European 
continent in the 14th century, the Balkans, being a borderland between Christian 
civilization and the Islamic world, became a region of great instability for centuries.  
Kosovo, situated in the heart of the Balkans at the crossroads of major north-south and 
west-east communication routes with its rich natural resources, fertile soil and 
Mediterranean climate, is a home for two peoples, the Serbs and Albanians, who claim 
the right to posses it.  Throughout the turbulent and complicated history of the region, 
filled with stories of bloody wars, the sacrifices of the population, and the never-ending 
struggle for independence and self-determination, two peoples developed conflicting 
national identities and contradicting positions over the status of Kosovo.  The history of 
the region, or more exactly the interpretation of the history by both peoples, stirs many 
controversies and serves to legitimize their claim to control over the region.   
B. ORIGINS OF THE CONFLICT AND ETHNIC IDENTITIES 
1. Meaning of Kosovo for the Serbs 
For most Serbs, Kosovo is an indisputable part of Serbia, the center of the 
mediaeval Serbian state established before the Ottoman invasion of the Balkans took 
place, and a spiritual and cultural nucleus that serves as a basis for creating a national 
identity of the Serbs.  The territory of Kosovo is considered to be a sacred land, an 
important religious center, and its significance is often compared with the importance of 
Jerusalem to the Jews.  The region’s historical background is also essential to Serbian 
national identity as Tim Judahh argues in his “Kosovo. War and Revenge”  “…he who 
holds the past holds the future.”5 
                                                 
5 Tim Judah, Kosovo. War and Revenge (Yale University Press, 2000), 2.   
7 
By 1166, when the new dynasty was established by Stefan Nemanja, the Serbian 
state started to expand far beyond its original territory in Raska towards the territory of 
modern Kosovo.  The founder of the Nemanjic dynasty, Stefan Nemanja, abdicated in 
1196 and became a monk.  His son Stefan continued the expansion towards Kosovo and 
successfully conquered it because of the declining power of the Byzantine Empire and 
the seizure of Constantinople in 1204.  Consequently, the Serbian state became the most 
powerful in the Balkans. 
By 1219, the Serbian Orthodox Church acquired an autocephalous status and 
moved to Pec, where the patriarchy was established.  Stefan’s younger brother Rastko 
became the first Archbishop and eventually was canonized after his death as Saint Sava.  
This event is fundamental for the development of the autonomous Serbian Orthodox 
Church, as well as for the history of the Serbian state.  It had a profound influence on the 
development of a national consciousness of the Serbs who “teetered on the brink between 
western Roman Catholicism and Byzantine, eastern Orthodoxy”6.  Religion was and still 
is widely seen as a part of the Serbian national identity rather than an individual belief.  
Since the monarch and the leader of the clergy were members of the same family, they 
shared a common objective for the creation of a strong state and keeping power within 
the family.  Moreover, “as most of the Nemanjic monarchs were canonized, their images 
were painted on the walls of the Serbian churches and monasteries.  So, for hundreds of 
years, the Serbian peasant went to church, and in his mind, the very idea of Christianity, 
resurrection and “Serbdom” blended together.”7  In so doing, the Nemanjic dynasty 
solved the crucial problem of legitimacy of their power.  For instance, even today, Saint 
Sava is considered the family’s saint patron by many Serbs who live not only in Kosovo 
but also in the rest of Serbia and Montenegro.   
The power of the Nemanjic dynasty was based on a powerful central state and the 
strong influence of the Orthodox Church.  Serbian rulers promoted trade and commerce 
because of the convenient geographical location of the state to main commercial routes 
going through it.  They built roads and fortresses to guard them.  They favored merchants 
and developed mining in Trepca and Novi Brdo, the main sources of revenues.  Although 
                                                 
6 Judah, 3.   
7 Ibid., 3.   
8 
the economy of the Serbian state was mostly agricultural, based on rich soil of Kosovo’s 
plains, “progress in mining also occurred based on deposits of gold, silver, copper and 
tin.”8  Gradually, Kosovo became the center of the Nemanjic state with its capital in 
Prizren.    
Serbian rulers constantly built churches and monasteries.  “Virtually the whole 
territory of southern Kosovo during the Middle Ages became the property of the big 
monasteries.”9  The most important are the Patriarchate in Pec, Gracanica monastery near 
Pristina, and the monastery in Visoki Decani.  The entire province acquired the Serbian 
name of Kosovo and Metohija.  This name is Greek in origin, because in Greek, “metoh” 
means “church property”.  This fact is important, because it clearly articulates the 
Church’s increasing influence.  “Thus, the Serbian Orthodox Church… becoming closely 
tied to the power of the state and a strong supporter of state policies.”10  “According to 
the Register of Cultural Monuments, in 1986, there were 372 cultural monuments in 
Kosovo and Metohija, of which 48% are Serbian, 20% Turkish, and 11% Albanian.”11  
This statistic serves to prove the legitimacy of the ‘historical claim” often employed by 
the Serbs to justify their demand to rule over the region. 
The Nemanjic dynasty ruled Serbia for 200 years and reached its apogee during 
Stefan Dusan’s reign in the mid-14th century.  At that time, the Serbian state incorporated 
the present day territories of Montenegro, Kosovo, Macedonia, Albania, parts of Bosnia, 
and a large area in northern Greece, and was proclaimed an Empire.  Kosovo became the 
geographical center of the Serbian state.   
Never before or since has Serbian power or territory been so great.  Today 
Serbian patriots look back to the age of Stefan Dusan as the most glorious 
in their history and regard him as a hero.12     
Kosovo is also significant to the Serbs because of the famous Battle of Kosovo 
Polje that took place there in 1389.  The Battle of Kosovo Polje is important to Serbian 
                                                 
8 Miranda Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo (Columbia University Press, 1998), 8. 
9 Vickers, 9. 
10 Ibid., 7.  
11 Srecko Mihailovic, “Kosovo: Between Co-Existence and Permanent Conflict,” in The Lessons of Yugoslavia, 
ed. Metta Spencer (Elsevier Science Inc, 2000), 279-307. 
12 Vickers, 10. 
9 
history because it was a starting point of the weakening of Serbia as a key power in the 
Balkan Peninsula.  Even though it was fully incorporated into the Ottoman Empire, only 
by 1459 did the defeat inflicted by the Ottoman Turks in 1389 end Serbian statehood.  
Serbia ceased to exist as an independent entity, and for several hundred years, Kosovo 
was lost for Serbs.  Since then, for many centuries, the Serbs have portrayed themselves 
as a people by the amount of suffering they have endured from Muslim Ottomans and 
associated with them Islamized Albanians.  Although Serbs continued to live in Kosovo, 
they gradually became second-class citizens in the province they once ruled.  “The Serbs 
therefore viewed the collapse of the medieval Serbian state as the central event in their 
history and found its explanation in the Battle of Kosovo.”13   
Serbs were the leading force among the Christians to confront the Ottoman 
invasion, which represented a threat of Islamization to the mainly Christian population of 
the Balkan Peninsula.  For the first time, the Serbian army encountered advancing 
Ottoman Turks in 1371 during the battle on the river Maritsa in modern Bulgaria and 
suffered defeat.  “Historians regard this battle as being of far greater military significance 
than famous Battle of Kosovo [Polje].”14  However, the latter battle had a more profound 
political impact.   
The immediate result of the Battle of Kosovo Polje was not clear.  Both sides 
suffered tremendous losses, including the loss of their leaders, and were not able to 
further pursue their objectives.  The struggle amongst the Serbian nobility for power was 
one of the aftermaths of the Battle and served as a basis for the creation of the influential 
myth about Kosovo.  As a response to contemporary needs, the defeat was transformed 
into a kind of moral victory for the Serbs and served as an inspiration for the future.  The 
Serbian king Lazar, who died in the battle, is reputed to have said “[b]etter it is for us to 
accept death from the sword in battle than to offer our shoulder to the enemy…  
Sufferings beget glory and labors lead to peace.”15 
 
                                                 
13 Ibid., 15. 
14 Judah, 4.    
15 Ibid.,  8.    
10 
Even if these words are only the product of medieval writers or Orthodox clergy 
and served to legitimize Lazar’s underage son’s ascent to power, their impact is very 
significant even today.  “As always in the Balkans […] the truth is not what matters, it is 
what people believe it to be.”16  The myth profoundly influenced Serbian nationalism 
aimed to liberate Kosovo from the yoke of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century.  
Serbian nationalistic leaders also extensively employed it at the end of the 1980’s to gain 
political benefits in their pursue for power.  Kosovo, with its myth, was a key element in 
preserving the Serbian national identity as a hope for resurrecting the Serbian state.  
Therefore, for the Serbs, renouncing Kosovo would virtually mean giving up their 
national and spiritual legacy.   
2.  The Meaning of Kosovo for Albanians 
Albanian claim for Kosovo is based on several elements.  The most important are 
the fact that Albanians constitute the majority population in Kosovo and that the province 
became the cradle for their national movement.  Indeed, according to the census of 1991, 
Albanians composed 1,607,690 or 82.2%17 of the overall population in Kosovo.   
Many Albanian scholars argue that Albanians are descendants of Illyrians and 
Dardanians, who lived in Kosovo long before the first Slavs arrived there.  They have 
always constituted a majority of the population in the region, even in the medieval 
Serbian kingdom.  Therefore, they are completely within their rights to claim the territory 
of Kosovo.  To the contrary, “many Serbs believe, equally falsely, that there were no 
Albanians at all in Kosovo before the end of the seventeenth century.”18  However, 
arguing around the subject of who was there first will lead nowhere.   
Before the arrival of the Ottomans in Kosovo, the population of the province was 
not homogeneous.  It consisted of Serbs, Vlachs and Albanians.  “These are [Vlachs and 
Albanians] mentioned several times in Dusan’s code, usually together.”19  As a minority, 
they received special treatment in the Nemanjic Kosovo.  “But all the evidence suggests 
                                                 
16 Ibid., 2.   
17 Julie Mertus, Kosovo. How Myths and Truths Started a War (University of California Press, 1999), 316. 
18 Noel Malcolm, Kosovo. A Short History (New York University Press, 1998), XXXII. 
19 Malcolm, 53.                  
11 
that they [Albanians] were only a minority in Medieval Kosovo.”20  The relations 
between the Serbs and Albanians were not always hostile.  For instance, during the 
famous Battle of Kosovo, some Albanian units fought on the Serbian side.  The tension 
developed throughout the two past centuries, as a result of a sequence of bloody wars, 
substantial involvement of outside powers and the influence they exercised.  
During the 500 years Ottoman rule, many Albanians converted to Islam and 
eventually attained a superior position over the Serbian Orthodox population.  The ethnic 
identity of Kosovo Albanians was built based on Islamic traditions in relentless rivalry 
with Orthodox Serbs for political and economic supremacy in the region.  “Religion not 
nationality was the fundamental factor in the Ottoman concept of governance.”21  The 
main reasons for religious conversion were economic rather than a matter of beliefs.  
Conversion to Islam ultimately meant the allocation of better arable land, paying less 
taxes and the possibility of making a career on Porte’s state service.  For nobility, it also 
meant keeping control over their domains and the preservation of feudal privileges.  For 
the lowest level of the Albanian population strata, conversion to Islam also meant the 
continuation of a habitual way of tribal life in which Serbs had no place.  Thus, by 
converting to Islam, Albanians were able to gain social, political, and economic 
dominance in Kosovo.  Since they did not have a strong national church, as Serbs did 
over the centuries, they were converted in higher proportions.  Therefore, the initial 
division of the population in Kosovo was based on religion.   
The continued increase in the conversions of the Albanians eventually led to 
expansion of their power in the province, brought them privileges and strengthened 
mistrust between the two communities.  Being in an inferior position derived from the 
status of Christians in a Muslim state, the Serbs began slowly to emigrate from the region 
to other parts of Serbia.  The “Great Serbian Exodus” of 1690, led by the religious leader 
Patriarch Arsenije Carnojevic III, is the most significant event that further misbalanced 
the ethic distribution in Kosovo.  During the Austro-Ottoman war, the Serbs supported 
Austria hoping for a possible liberation of Kosovo from Ottoman rule.  As a result of the 
defeat of the Austrian army and fearing repressions from the Porte, “37,000 Serbian 
                                                 
20 Ibid., 57.                  
21 Vickers, 19.    
12 
families from the Kosovo region […] left for exile in Hungary”22.  The mass departure of 
the Serbs “opened the way for the resettling of Kosovo by Albanians, lured down from 
the hills by the fertile land and encouraged by the Ottomans”23.  The Albanian Muslims 
were gradually replacing the Serbian Orthodox population and became a majority. For 
that reason, ethnic migrations are crucial in understanding why a modern conflict in 
Kosovo, largely based on demographic upheaval, became possible.   
C.  FROM THE BALKAN WARS TO WORLD WAR II 
1. Beginning of the Conflict 
The first serious conflict between the Serbs and Albanians was provoked by the 
Russo-Turkish war of 1876-1878.  Serbia and Montenegro took advantage of the 
weakening power of the Ottoman Empire, expanded their territories and conquered the 
northern and eastern parts of Kosovo.  Serbia became an independent state.  These 
actions initiated new waves of migrations directed in and out of the region.  Thousands of 
Albanians were forcibly expelled and fled to the territory of Kosovo, which remained 
under Ottoman control.  “The operations of the Serbian army provoked a wave of refuges 
…as an estimated 30, 000 Albanians deserted those parts of the region which the Serbian 
army occupied.”24  The practice of burning houses and mosques in order to prevent the 
Albanian population from returning became the norm.  This was not just a spontaneous 
hostility driven by the wish for revenge by local Serbs.  It was an official policy, since 
military units were involved in creating territories with a homogeneous Serbian 
population.   
2. Prizren League and Beginning of the Albanian National Movement 
As already mentioned, Kosovo became important for the development of the 
Albanian national identity.  The province became a cradle for the Albanian national 
movement that was focused on Albanian nationalism.  During the Russo-Turkish war, in 
1878, the Prizren League was formed in Kosovo and played a significant role in the 
Albanian national movement.  As a response to the threat of partition of territories 
populated mainly by Albanians amongst the Balkan states, the purpose of the League was 
to organize military and political resistance and unite these territories “into one political 
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and administrative unit”25.  The foundation of the Prizren League was the first attempt to 
unite all Albanians, both Muslims and Christians, descending from numerous clans and 
speaking different dialects into one force with the same objective.  In this sense, this 
national movement can be considered progressive. 
Initially, the interests of the Muslim clergy, Catholic and Orthodox priests and 
wealthy landowners, who created the League, were compatible with the goal of the 
Ottomans to keep control over the region.  For the Albanian nobility, sovereignty of the 
Porte was a protection of their political, economical and religious rights and a guarantee 
of their power.  Autonomy within the Empire would fit their interests the best.  However, 
the declining Ottoman state was unable to compete with dynamically developing newly 
independent Balkan states over power.  Moreover, the situation was largely influenced by 
the struggle amongst major European states, including Russia, for the balance of power in 
Southern Europe.  Encountering this pressure, Porte failed to defend its interests on the 
Balkan Peninsula.  Therefore, it was not able to ensure the unity and cohesion of the 
Albanian-populated lands.  Relations between the League and the Ottoman state 
gradually deteriorated and Albanians started to consider the possibility of independence.     
“Meanwhile, the anti-Christian tenor of the League worried many non-Muslim 
Albanians, who wavered over joining it.”26  However, conservative Muslims, who 
constituted a majority among leaders of the League, outnumbered their voice.  As a result 
of the peace settlement of the Congress of Berlin and signing the treaty between Serbia 
and the Ottoman Empire, the Serbian army withdrew from Kosovo.  Intolerance towards 
Serbs, who continued to live within the Ottoman Empire and were mainly Orthodox 
Christians, increased.  Both, Turks and Albanians, regarded Serbs as the closest 
supporters and allies of the Russians and, thus, were considered enemies.  The Serbian 
population continued to flee Kosovo in increasing numbers because of the threats, 
intimidation and fear of oppression.   
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By 1880, when the Prizren League took control of Kosovo, the region drowned in 
disorder and chaos “where the Koran and the rifle are the only law”27.  “There are few 
Servian villages which are not robbed periodically of all their sheep and cattle.”28  
Albanian neighbors created such conditions that the Serbs could not endure.  “Blood can 
be wiped out only with blood”, wrote Edith Durham, the redoubtable English traveler and 
writer, following her trip to northern Albania and Kosovo in 1908.29  “Hunger, want and 
disease are the natural accompaniments of daily oppression.”30  “At the same time the 
Mujahidin were actively encouraging a policy akin to ethnic cleansing.”31 
Most of Kosovo remained part of the Ottoman Empire until the Balkan war broke 
out in 1912.  The decades before can be characterized in general terms as perpetual unrest 
in territories populated by Albanians.  They continued to advocate for more 
decentralization of the Ottoman Empire and their demand for national autonomy in these 
regions only grew with time.  It was expressed in frequent insurrections accompanied by 
a sharp increase of violence.  “A clash was therefore inevitable because the Young Turks 
were totally opposed to nationalism within the Empire and believed that only enforced 
Turkification of all subjects would keep the Empire intact and strong.”32  Therefore, all 
attempts of rebellion aiming for autonomy and an awakening of national consciousness, 
were fiercely suppressed by the central power.  Deeply disaffected by the reforms of the 
Young Turks, Kosovo Albanians “launched yet another insurrection […] after population 
had refused to pay new severe taxes levied from Istanbul on imported goods”33.  
Interestingly enough, this kind of strategy will be often employed by Kosovo Albanians 
throughout the 20th century.  No attempt was made to find a political solution, but the 
rejection of governmental institutes, along with armed resistance, inevitably led to an 
escalation of violence.   
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The Albanian national resistance movement was weakened by the absence of an 
universally recognized Albanian authority able to coordinate and lead all segments of 
society.  As a result of a strong clan system, tribes continued to act independently in their 
own interests.  Isolated Slav settlements and Ottoman garrisons were the target of 
frequent attacks.  Central authorities responded with the imposition of severe terror.  “An 
estimated 150,000 people fleeing Kosovo, of whom roughly 100,000 were Serbs, just 
under a third of Kosovo’s estimated overall Serbian population.”34  The negative aspect 
of the Albanian movement was that the Serbian population suffered calamities from 
being caught in the clash between the Albanians and Ottoman Turks.  “A Serbian agent 
Grigorije Bozovic noted in 1912:  
The Albanians are on the verge of becoming a nation, and they to settle 
their issue in Kosovo, and that they are neither the conquerors nor the 
conquered. We fall between them and the Young Turks, and both will 
throw their rage at us.35 
3. New Cycle of Violence 
The ideology of European nationalism served as a foundation for the emergence 
of the Balkan states created in the 18th and 19th centuries.  Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece and 
Albania could be characterized as irredentist nation states.  Thus “as irredentist nations – 
that is, as nations committed to the recovery of their ‘unredeemed’ national territories.  
Their legitimacy rested entirely on their ability to embody the national ‘imagined 
community’.”36 Since segments of their population were still incorporated into the 
declining Ottoman Empire, they were eager to expand their territories by virtue of war.   
The period including the Balkan Wars and following by World War I brought 
more suffering to the civilian population.  Combat operations and movement of 
belligerent armies were accompanied by atrocities committed by all sides.   
Entire Albanian villages had been turned into pillars of fire… There the 
Serbs broke into Turkish and Albanian houses and performed the same 
task in every case: plundering and killing.”37   
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Since Albanians fought together with the Ottomans against the Balkan League 
formed by Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia and Montenegro, the civilian population was paying 
the price.  Serbia retook the territory of Kosovo and advanced further to northern 
Albania.   
Albanians were not able to secure the unity of their territories mainly because 
Serbia already had a state with an organized modern army and was keen to liberate 
territories, which historically constituted “Old Serbia”.  Serbia cultivated the 
development of a national conscience and widely employed nationalism based on history 
and myths of Kosovo.   
Thousands of young Serbian volunteers rushed to join the army, yearning 
to avenge the Battle of Kosovo… The realization that Kosovo might 
finally be liberated after more than five centuries fired their imaginations 
and emotions, and the Serbian army was unstoppable.38   
The new Albanian state, which was formally recognized by the Treaty of London 
in 1913, failed to unite all territories predominantly populated by the Albanians.  Notably, 
the Albanian population of Kosovo was almost half the population of Albania itself.  
Further, the borders of Albania were still in dispute; therefore, reasons for continuing 
hostility were still present.  Thus, the groundwork was laid for raising an Albanian 
question needing a resolution. 
During World War I, Serbia encountered a war on two fronts.  By 1915, the 
Serbian army was defeated by the Austro-Hungarians and had to be withdrawn from 
Kosovo.  The Albanians of Kosovo did not have to wait long until they could get their 
revenge.  “An estimated 100,000 Serbs died on the grueling trek through Kosovo and 
Albania.”39       
Kosovo was lost to Serbia until it was reoccupied in 1918 by the Serbian army 
and incorporated into a new state called the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.  
Eventually, King Alexander changed the name of the new state to Yugoslavia with the 
establishment of a dictatorship in 1929.  The new Yugoslav state was officially defined as 
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“one nation with three names”40.  However, Yugoslav nationality, hoping to become the 
basis for the new state long before being actually created, never came into existence.  
One of the acute problems the Yugoslav government encountered was national identity.  
“At this time the national balance was approximately 43 per cent Serbian, 23 per cent 
Croatian, 8,5 per cent Slovenian, 6 per cent Bosnian Muslim, 5 per cent Macedonian 
Slavic, and 3,6 per cent Albanian, with the final 14 per cent composed of the 
minorities.”41  As the name suggested, the new state was a country of southern Slavs, but 
Albanians are not Slavs.  They did not want Kosovo to become part of the new state 
because it would mean the reestablishment of Serbian or Yugoslav rule exercised from 
the capital of Belgrade.   
The ethnic Albanian population of Kosovo found it most difficult to adjust to the 
new order in the Europe-like organized state where they lost all privileges given to them 
during Ottoman rule.  The Albanians found themselves in a situation when ruled by the 
former “Rayah”42 who were inferior to them and where treated as serfs until recently.  
“Old and new hatreds had deepened between Serbs and Albanians.  A sense of fear, anger 
and betrayal now pervaded the Albanian villages of Kosovo.”43  From the early 
beginnings of the new state, Albanians started to resist the central authorities.  
The actions of the new Serbian authorities were highly unpopular amongst the 
Kosovo Albanians.  Every attempt at reforms in Kosovo ended in failure.  The 
government’s initial attempts to consolidate and strengthen its power in Kosovo 
encountered fierce Albanian resistance, known as “kacaks”.  The emergence of the 
“kacak” movement was a result of military and gendarme repression aimed to disarm 
Albanians and install Serbian authorities.  Many Albanians were freedom fighters but to 
the authorities, they were outlawed bands of guerillas.  In the words of a local Serbian  
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politician, they were described as “…not plain criminals, political or social brigands, as 
such, but a particular type of Albanian outlaw […] who have become a revolting 
sickness, nowadays assuming a new nationalist, and consequently antistate form…”44   
As early as 1918, prominent Albanian leaders from Kosovo founded the 
Committee for the National Defense of Kosovo based in Albania in Shkodra.  The 
Committee had no official status, but enjoyed substantial support from the Albanian 
government.  At that time, leading Kosovo Albanians participated in Albanian 
government and parliamentary life.  Their irredentist aspirations were focused on the 
creation of Greater Albania including territories populated by Albanians in Montenegro, 
Serbia, Macedonia and Albania itself.  Therefore, the theoretical foundation of the 
Committee was similar to that of the Prizren League, but emphasized the creation of an 
independent Albanian state.   
However, as in earlier instances, Albanian leaders were not seeking political 
peaceful settlements with the central government, at this time represented by Serbian 
authorities.  The main goal of the Committee was the encouragement of anti-Serbian 
insurgency.  The Committee smuggled weapons to Kosovo and organized armed 
resistance.  It “established ties with Italians, Macedonian insurgents, and various Croat 
groups”45; in other words, those who were in conflict with the Serbian government and 
eager to overthrow it.  Again, Albanian leaders acted in the same manner they first 
adopted in their struggle during the Ottoman rule.  Apart from conducting armed 
rebellion, they also “urged Albanians not to pay the taxes and to refuse to serve in the 
army”46. 
The Yugoslav Constitution, based on the results of 1920 elections, reflected the 
interests of the Serbian political elite to centralize power in Belgrade.  Religious, ethnic 
and language differences of non-Slav minorities were largely neglected by the 
government.  It pursued a policy of assimilation towards minorities and Albanians were 
not an exclusion.  “Serbian propaganda simultaneously dehumanized Albanians, 
presenting them as utterly incapable of governing themselves and as the sort of element 
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that ought to be exterminated.”47  The Albanian language was banned for official matters 
and all educational systems had to be conducted using the Serb-Croat language.  
“Albanian philanthropic and cultural societies were closed, along with Albanian 
schools.”48  During agrarian reform, land was expropriated from the Albanians on the 
pretext of a lack of documents proving ownership and claims that they possessed 
excessive amount of land.  Land had to be allocated in accordance with the number of 
family members.  This measure brought unintended results.  It affected the birth rate of 
Albanian families.  The more family members one has, the more land he will be 
allocated.  The Albanian population of Kosovo therefore continued to grow and changed 
the ethnic balance even more in favor of the Albanians.   
According to the Yugoslav census of 1921, “based on the Albanian mother-
tongue, out of 436,929 inhabitants in Kosovo, 280,440 or 64,1 per cent were 
Albanians”49.  However, these figures may be unreliable as suggested by foreign 
observers “there were at least 700,000 Albanians in Yugoslavia in the 1920s”50.  In 
general, the Yugoslav government largely considered the Albanian population of Kosovo 
to be an untruthful element ready for revolt at any given moment.  Fearing the 
strengthening of influence of irredentist Albania over the Albanian population in Kosovo 
that might cause problems in the future, and willing to reestablish balance to the 
population, the Serbian government initiated a policy of colonization of Kosovo, which 
lasted until 1941.   
Yugoslav authorities dominated by Serbs encouraged Serbian and Montenegrin 
settlers to come to Kosovo.  The colonization was conducted in two waves and “perhaps 
70,000 people altogether, equivalent to more than ten per cent of Kosovo’s entire 
population”51 came to the province.  The colonists enjoyed a wide range of advantages 
and incentives.  According to the Law on the Colonization of 11 June 1931, “the colonist 
were granted up to 50 hectares of land, free transport to the place of settlement, the free 
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use of communal forests and pastures, exemption from any taxation for three years, and 
occasionally houses.”52  The relations between settlers and Albanians were tense.  
Antagonism derived from the fact that most of the land given to colonists was 
expropriated from the suspected kacaks.  Moreover, even if local Albanians were not 
excluded from the process of agrarian reform, it was conducted in favor of the Slavs.  It 
was estimated that out of 14,000 families to whom the land was allocated, only 4,00053 
were Albanians.  Kacaks continued their attacks against the colonists until the mid-1920s.   
Along with colonization, Albanians were encouraged to emigrate from 
Yugoslavia.  Some 150,00054 people are believed to have left for Turkey in the years 
between 1918 and 1941.  In 1938, Yugoslavia and Turkey signed an agreement that 
foresaw the emigration of 200,00055 people from Kosovo under the pretext of the 
repatriation of the ‘Turkish Muslim’ population.  In response to Albanian criticism at the 
League of Nations in 1929 over the policy implemented in Kosovo, the Yugoslav 
delegation stated: “ [o]ur position has always been that in our southern regions, which 
have been integral parts of our state…there are no national minorities.”56  Only World 
War II hampered the implementation of the Yugoslav government plans. 
With the beginning of World War II, Kosovo was divided into three sectors by the 
Axis Powers.  The strategically important region of Mitrovica, with its led and zinc-
producing Trepca mining, was attached to Serbia, and occupied by Germany.  Bulgaria 
took a small part on the north-east portion of the region.  The rest of the province, 
together with the north-western part of Macedonia, was occupied by Italy, and as 
announced by the Italian occupation authorities “would come under civil administration 
as part of the kingdom of Albania”57.  The Kosovo Albanians were very enthusiastic.  
Even though Italians were occupiers, they united most of the Albanian-populated areas in  
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one state.  By decrees of October 1941 and February 1942, all the inhabitants of Italian-
occupied Kosovo, including Slavs, became citizens of Albania.  Thus, even if for a short 
period of time, Greater Albania was created.   
In occupied territories, German authorities formed various types of military or 
militia-type units.  With the personal approval of Hitler, an SS Division Skenderbeg, 
consisting of 12,00058 men, was formed in Kosovo for activity in the province.  The 
ranks of the Division were filled with German officers and Albanian volunteers as 
soldiers.  A new cycle of violence broke out because the Albanians seized this 
opportunity to exact revenge on the Serbian population.  Serbian settlers who came to the 
region during colonization were the primary subject of attacks.  “Units of the division 
gained an unenviable reputation, apparently preferring rape, pillage, and murder to 
fighting, particularly in Serbian areas.”59  As a result of Kosovo Albanians’ attacks, a part 
of the Serbian population fled to Serbian proper. Herman Neubacher, the chief German 
political officer in Belgrade, calculated “that since 1941, 40,000 Serbs and Montenegrins 
had been driven out of Kosovo”.60  Apparently, the Albanians were not very reliable 
servicemen as the units of the division for susceptible to mass desertions.  By early 
October 1944, the commander of the Army Group “E” was informed whose total strength 
of the Skenderbeg Division had fallen to 3,500 and “the division is without any particular 
will to fight”61.  As the German commander of the Division suggested “Albanians had 
not developed since the time of Skenderbeg in the fifteen century, they had developed no 
concept of ‘state’ or ‘nation’…They went on the attack only as long as there was 
something to steal.”62  
Like the Nazis who had tremendous difficulties in collaborating with Kosovo 
Albanians, the Communists had encountered even more serious problems in Kosovo.  For 
instance, in 1937, only 23 Albanians63 were members of the Communist Party of 
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insignificant number of Albanians and only individuals joined the CPY.  For most 
Albanians, the CPY was associated with the Serbs and the return of Yugoslavia, that is to 
them, Serbian rule.  They considered the CPY as an “alien Pan-Slavic organization, 
which ignored their national aspirations.”64  To propagate Communist ideas and in order 
to gain support among Kosovo Albanians, Tito established strong links with the 
Communist party of Albania led by Enver Hoxha.  Some light concessions toward 
Albanian nationalism were made and slogans of “self-determination, up to and including 
secession”65 were widely employed in CPY’s rhetoric.  
D. CONCLUSIONS 
Kosovo has a surplus of history and myths that serve to legitimize the “historical 
claims” of Kosovo Serbs and Albanians to control the disputed territory.  “The Serbs call 
Kosovo the Serbian Jerusalem while the Albanians see it as their Piedmont.”66  Under the 
influence of different historical events, two peoples developed distinct ethnic identities 
largely based on constant opposition to each other over the political status of the region 
that eventually led them to a prolonged conflict.  Even though different ethnic groups 
exercised control over the region at different times, ultimately Serbs became the 
prevailing power.  
In competition for control over Kosovo, the Serbs managed to establish their rule 
in the province by the end of World War I because they had several significant 
advantages over their Albanian rivals.  The most important is that Serbs had their own 
independent state with all the necessary institutions including a central government, a 
modern armed forces and police, a developed fiscal system and a judiciary.  Neither the 
newly independent Albanian state with its inferior military and economic capabilities 
compared to those of Serbia nor the Kosovo Albanians with their lack of unity and 
absence of any state institutions even in rudimentary form, could withstand armed 
conflict with Serbia.  Furthermore, the Serbian state experienced comprehensive political 
and diplomatic support of the Entente states, in particular Great Britain and France, not to 
mention the traditional strong ties maintained between the Serbs and Russia. 
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The violent character of the conflict derives from the readiness of both peoples to 
apply brutal force although on different pretexts.  Albanians believe that they have a 
legitimate right for an armed resistance to Serbian authorities and secessionism because 
they constituted a majority of population in the region, which was forcefully incorporated 
into the Serbian state.  They consider Serbian rule to be a foreign power and seek any 
possibility to resist.  For Serbs, Albanians represent a threat always allied with foreign 
invaders whether it was the Ottoman Turks, the Austro-Hungarian Empire or Nazi 
Germany.  They were all considered to pose a challenge to sovereignty and the survival 
of the independent Serbian state.  Due to the historical experience, the Serbs believe that 
the Kosovo Albanians are a “fifth column” and their main objective is separatism.  




III.  “MAJORITY RULE” VS. “MINORITY RIGHTS” 
Kosovo, or Kosova, could be either Serbian or Albanian, but not both.67  
A. A “TIME BOMB” IN “BALKAN’S POWDER KEG” 
The majority of Kosovo Albanians as well as Serbs still highly reveres Tito, and 
sees the era of Yugoslavia during Communism as being the most prosperous and stable of 
times.  Tito was a charismatic leader and his power was based on his own popularity and 
image of a hero and a great leader of the Yugoslav people during World War II.  
However, he did not hesitate to use brute force when he felt it was necessary, especially 
to suppress rare manifestations of nationalism in the federative units.  For an average 
Yugoslavian citizen, regardless of ethnic origin, Tito’s era was associated with high 
standards of life, an ability to travel, study and work abroad freely. 
On the other hand, during Tito’s rule, besides frequent amendments to the existing 
constitution, Yugoslavia received new constitutions four times in less than 30 years.  The 
Yugoslav Constitutions were adopted in 1946, 1953, 1963 and 1974.  They were also 
amended in 1967, 1968, 1971, 1981 and 1988 to keep pace with the socio-political, 
cultural, and economical development of the state.  Nonetheless, the most pressing 
problem of relations among nationalities in Yugoslavia has never been solved.  
Moreover, because of frequent changes in the constitution, the power of the federal 
government was eventually undermined and leadership of the republics and the 
autonomous provinces was gradually increasing their authority at the local level.  In 
doing so, Tito planted a “time bomb” in the “Balkan’s powder keg”.  Due to his policy of 
suppression of national aspirations, such leaders as Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia and 
Franjo Tudjman in Croatia, came to power on the wave of increased nationalism at the 
end of the 1980’s and the beginning of 1990.   
B.  THE AUTONOMOUS REGION WITHIN THE FEDERATIVE PEOPLE’S 
REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA 
In July 1945, Kosovo was annexed formally to Serbia.  It was declared the 
“Autonomous Region of Kosovo and Metohija” and became a constituent part of Serbia 
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within the new Federative People’s Republic of Yugoslavia (FPRY).  In doing so, the 
Yugoslav Communist leadership was pursuing several goals.  First, and probably the 
most important goal, was its desire to consolidate its power by securing the sympathy of 
the Serbian population.  By exploiting the issue of Kosovo, the Communists were able to 
promulgate the tenets of Marxism-Leninism even among the supporters of the idea of a 
Greater Serbia.  Second, Kosovo was strategically important to the newly established 
state because of its geographical location.  Situated between Serbia, Montenegro and 
Macedonia with natural barriers of mountain ridges on its borders, the region virtually 
separated the federal units from each other.   
Moreover, during that time, extensive preparations were made to establish the 
Balkan Federation, which would include Albania and Bulgaria under Yugoslav tutelage.  
This was possible because Yugoslavia emerged from World War II as the strongest 
Balkan state and Tito’s Communist regime enjoyed substantial support from Moscow.  
Tito could play the Kosovo card during negotiations with Enver Hoxha and make the idea 
of a Balkan Federation more attractive within Albania.  In addition, the problem of 
Kosovo, otherwise often referred to as the Albanian question, would be solved within the 
framework of a wider Balkan Federation.  Yugoslavia and Albania started to plan the 
unification of their Armed Forces and signed an economic agreement.  The Albanian 
language was given equal status with Serbo-Croatian and thousands of specialists were 
sent to Kosovo and Tirana in accordance with the exchange program.  At the Plenum of 
the Albanian Communist Party in December 1946, Enver Hoxha asked rhetorically:  
Is it in our interests to ask for Kosovo?  That is not a progressive thing to 
do.  No, in this situation, on the contrary, we must do whatever is possible 
to ensure that the Kosovars become brothers with Yugoslavs.68    
On the other hand, the incorporation of Kosovo into Serbia met with fierce 
opposition from local Albanians.  Since the Kosovo’s regional Communist Party was 
predominately Serbian, immediately after the war, Albanians constituted only 0.16% of 
the Communist Party members69, and Communist promises about giving the Albanians 
the right for self-determination were not delivered, and the Albanians did not see the 
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difference between the old Yugoslavia and new regime.  By the end of 1944 and the 
beginning of 1945, the advancing units of the National Liberation Army encountered 
armed resistance from the Kosovo Albanians.  The communist leadership, having under 
its authority 800,000 experienced fighters,70 responded with harsh measures, and in 
February 1945, declared martial law in the region.  According to Albanian sources, as 
many as 47,000 Albanians71 were the victims of systematic mass executions conducted 
by Communists during the 1944-46 uprising and following the “disarming” and “search 
and destroy missions”.    
According to the Yugoslav Constitution of 1946, created on a blueprint of Stalin’s 
Soviet Constitution of 1936, the new socialist state was defined as a federal state 
consisting of six sovereign republics.72  Even though one of the main principles 
embedded in the Constitution was equality of all nationalities and minority groups, the 
administrative boundaries of the republics were drawn in accordance with which ethic 
group constituted a majority of the population.  This ethic group was considered as a 
tutelage nation for a republic.  Furthermore, Yugoslavia’s peoples were divided into two 
categories: “the hosts and historical guests”.  “The hosts or nations are Serbs, Croats, 
Slovenes, Macedonians and Montenegrins.  The guests are called ‘national minorities,’ 
and they include all other groups.”73  The “other groups” traditionally include Albanians, 
Ashkali, Bosniaks, Hungarians, Roma, Turks and other smaller ethnic groups.  In fact, 
the framework of the first post World War II Yugoslav Constitution put Albanians in a 
paradoxical situation.  Being a majority population in Kosovo, Albanians were 
considered only as a national minority.  In addition, although the Autonomous Region of 
Kosovo and Metohija had its representatives in a chamber of the federal legislature, all 
internal affairs were within the jurisdiction of the Republic of Serbia.  Therefore, the 
local administration was denied any independent decision-making authority.  The non-
resolution of the Albanian question in Kosovo with the Constitution of 1946 added 
bitterness to the Albanian’s feelings toward the state.    
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The split between Yugoslavia and Albania that followed the rift between Tito and 
Stalin in 1948 only aggravated the situation in Kosovo.  Yugoslav Communists saw 
Albania as a bastion of Stalinism and a springboard for a possible Soviet invasion.  
Ideological differences and contradicting positions occupied by the two states directly 
impacted the Albanian population in Kosovo.  The Yugoslav leadership feared that 
propaganda from Tirana might have an appeal amongst Kosovo Albanians as well as the 
fact that the memories of atrocities committed by Partisan units during the suppression of 
the Albanian revolt of 1944-46 were still fresh in their minds.  Since Albanians continued 
to treat new authorities with open hostility and were “the most hostile element”74, they 
were under constant oppression from the Yugoslavian State Security Service, the UDB75.  
Thousands of Albanians were arrested and incriminated on different offences, including 
nationalism, irredentism and espionage.  In addition, the border between Yugoslavia and 
Albania remained relatively open until 1948 and the alleged reason that Sigurimi76 agents 
might have penetrated deep into Albanian society in Kosovo only served to tighten 
security measures.   
“During the period from 1948 to 1966, border clashes break out along the Kosovo 
-Albanian border.”77  The UDB under the leadership of a “strong man of Serbia” 
Alexsander Rankovic, who was a vice-president of Yugoslavia and a Serb by nationality, 
“heightened persecution of the Albanian population in Kosovo”78.  The extensive 
surveillance and harassment both by the police and UDB of Albanians persisted well 
until the removal of Rankoic from his position in 1966.  The Albanian population was 
encouraged to emigrate to Turkey and a new Yugoslav-Turkish agreement was signed by 
1953.  “Since the UDB officers in Kosovo were, according to statistics for 1956, 58 
percent Serb, 28 percent Montenegrin and only 13 percent Albanian, their operations 
could only add to the increasingly bitter sense of ethnic polarization in the province.”79   
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However, the initial polarization immediately after the war rose from a 
provisional decree that banned the return of Serbian colonists to the province.  At the 
same time, the Yugoslav government allowed approximately 25,000 Albanians to come 
to Kosovo as a gesture of a good will and “to correct previous injustice to the 
Albanians”80.  In addition, the Yugoslav government allowed the immigration of 5,000 
Albanians81 to the region who were seeking refuge from the Hoxha purges of alleged 
Titoists within the ranks of the Albanian Communist party.  These decisions made by 
Tito were highly unpopular amongst the Serbs and was considered to be pro-Albanian.   
There are numerous accusations that the Yugoslav government ruled Kosovo in a 
manner similar to that of prewar authorities and treated Kosovo as a colony.  Therefore, 
some speculations, particularly popular among proponents of the Albanian cause, are 
keen to explain the high percentage of Serbs and Montenegrins in the state security 
apparatus as an attempt to exercise revenge on Albanians for their collaborationism with 
the occupying forces during the war and predominance of Slavs in the state 
administration as proof of the colonial status of Kosovo.  “Although this was essentially 
just the expression of an antidemocratic order, the Albanian population perceived it as 
primarily the product of a Serbian regime.”82  Additionally, these explanations could not 
withstand the critics because a majority of Partisan ranks that served as basis for both the 
Yugoslav Peoples Army (JNA) and UDB were recruited at the major theaters of fighting 
during World War II such as Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro.   
Partisan (as well as Chetnik) leaders were recruited mainly from among 
pre-war Army officers.  Throughout most of 1942, the Partisans fielded 
two Montenegrins and four Serbian battalions, leavened with just a few 
fighters of other nationalities.83  
Albanians could not constitute a bureaucracy in the administration at the local 
level simply because of the absence of trained specialists and a lack of intelligentsia.  
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Following World War II, “Albanian ‘intellectuals’ were merely hastily trained primary 
and secondary school teachers”84.  According to the Yugoslav census conducted in 1948, 
73 percent of the 750,483 Albanians in Yugoslavia85 were illiterate.  “The few who could 
read and write did so in the Cyrillic alphabet and knew nothing about their own 
alphabet.”86  Albanian society continued to be relatively conservative and was organized 
in a clan or large family system, also known as “zadruga”, which was significantly 
influenced by the tenets of Islam and customary law.  Women were separated from men 
and forced to wear veils.  The tradition of blood feuds continued to be widely 
disseminated virtually locking thousands of Albanian men in their houses.  As some 
observers estimated in the late 1980’s, up to 17,000 Kosovo Albanian men87 were 
threatened with death because of blood feuds.  “This patriarchal way of life was still the 
norm in many Albanian villages well into the 1990s.”88  These also led to the isolation of 
the Kosovo Albanians and limited their integration in Yugoslav society.   
On top of all the social and political problems, the Kosovo economic situation 
was especially difficult.  Even though the region’s main product before the war was 
agriculture and the only industrial complex was Trepca mines and smelter, as a result of 
the war, “more than 70 percent of the region’s meager industry was destroyed and not a 
single kilometer of road was asphalted”89.  Therefore, by incorporating Kosovo into 
Yugoslavia, the Communist government encountered the immense task of modernizing 
and developing the region in political, social and economic spheres.  
C.  MODERNIZATION OF KOSOVO:  THE POLITICAL, ECONOMICAL 
AND CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE AUTONOMY 
As part of the modernization process of the Albanian society, the state promoted a 
campaign to erase illiteracy.  One hundred fifty seven schools90 for Albanian children 
were opened in Kosovo between 1945 and 1950 and courses for illiterate adults were 
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offered.  By 1950, Kosovo had 258 cultural and educational societies91 aimed at 
developing Albanian national culture in Yugoslavia.  In addition, the government 
undertook an immense task to rebuild the infrastructure and began a program of 
industrialization.  However, because of the rift in relations between Yugoslavia and 
Albania, the territory of Kosovo was considered too vulnerable to outside attack.  
Therefore, the main investments were injected into the extractive industry.  During the 
post-war period, several artificial lakes, including Gazivoda near Mitrovica, Batlava near 
Podujevo, and Gracanica near Pristina, were created to fulfill the water needs of towns, 
arable lands, and electric plants in Obilic near Prishtina.  
The Yugoslav Constitution implemented in 1953 was radically different from the 
previous one because it completely diverged from the Soviet constitutional model.  This 
constitution defined Yugoslavia “as a community of people whose ‘socialist 
consciousness’ supersedes national consciousness”.92  In addition, the Yugoslav brand of 
Communism also diverged from the Soviet economic model because it was based on self-
management.  In order to promote the Yugoslavian type of Communism, which was 
different from any other in Eastern Europe because it was self-made and not created by 
an outside power, and to minimize any potential for the rebirth of ethnic nationalism, the 
Yugoslav leadership placed the entire blame for atrocities committed during the war 
exclusively on Axis powers.  New myths were created under the famous slogan of 
“Bratstvo I Jedinstvo”93 in order to promote patriotic feelings and to consolidate the 
population’s loyalty to the state.  The input of all nations and nationalities in a common 
victory was considered equally valuable.  The public discussions about ethnically based 
conflicts and injustices made by Yugoslav peoples toward each other during World War 
II become virtually forbidden.  “The citizens of the ‘new’ Yugoslavia […] were 
encouraged to think about themselves as Yugoslavs, rather than members of this or that 
national, ethnic, or religious group.”94   
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The 1960’s were marked by two important events that significantly impacted the 
development of Kosovo.  By 1963, the new Yugoslav and Serbian constitutions were 
adopted.  Since the “Regional Council” of Kosovo at which Metohija was changed into a 
“Provincial Assembly”, the status of Kosovo was upgraded to that of Vojvodina.  
Nevertheless, according to the Yugoslav Constitution, republics were considered 
essential components of the Federation.  Therefore, Serbia’s political control over its 
autonomies was strengthened.  “From constituent elements of the Federation 
constitutionally recognized, they became ‘socio-political’ communities within the 
Republic [of Serbia]’ (Article 112) or ‘juridical creations’ of the Republican 
constitution.”95 Thus, real autonomy for Kosovo was reduced even further.  
In 1966, Alexsander Rankovic was retired from his position as a result of an inter-
party quarrel regarding the design of the Federation and competition over power within 
the party.  Being a committed proponent of centralism, he lost his fight against those, 
including Tito, who saw the solution to Yugoslavia’s burgeoning national problem in the 
further decentralization of the state and giving more economic and decision-making 
powers to the federative units.  Tito used the rift within the Party and the ousting of 
Rankovic to consolidate his personal power.  The UDB was purged from cadres loyal to 
Rankovic and the overall role of the State Security apparatus was reduced.  Moreover, the 
entire blame for the discriminatory and repressive state’s policy toward Kosovo 
Albanians was placed exclusively on the UDB.  “The Sixth Plenum of the Serbian Party 
Central Committee issue[d] a condemnation of ‘certain sections of the State Security 
apparatus for discriminatory and illegal practices entirely contrary to the League of 
Communists of Yugoslavia’s program and the Yugoslav Constitution.”96  
The measures adopted during the Plenum to “eliminate the consequences of the 
earlier deformations and create new conditions for the many-faceted affirmation of 
Albanian nationality”97 signaled to Kosovo Albanians that Serb domination in Kosovo’s 
administration, the Party’s regional organization and security apparatus had come to an 
end.  “As result of the severe criticism of the police role in Kosovo, an emigrant from 
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Albania was appointed chief of police in Kosovo.”98  Albanians gradually began to 
replace Serbs in important positions within the bureaucracy and the Party hierarchy at the 
local level.  Although some elements within the emerging Albanian elite pressed for more 
rights and greater autonomy for the Province up until the creation of the Albanian 
Republic, only some concessions were made by Tito as part of the liberalization process.  
The Province was allowed to promulgate its own laws that would not confront the 
federal and Serbian constitutions.  Kosovo was allowed to have its representatives in the 
federal government separate from the Serb delegation.  The name Metohija was omitted 
from the official name of the Province because of its Serb-Orthodox connotation and 
Albanians gained the right to freely fly their flag, which was identical to the flag of the 
state of Albania.  The two last events were only symbolically important but they 
demonstrated that the balance of power within the Province started to shift in favor of the 
Albanians.  
In 1969, the bilingual University of Pristina opened.  Until this moment, Kosovo 
Albanians had access to Albanian language instructions only in primary and secondary 
schools.  Due to the normalization in relationships between Yugoslavia and Albania, both 
were threatened by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and the shortage of 
scholarly literature in the Albanian language, 237 university professors99 from Albania 
were invited to teach in Pristina.  “Over 20 percent of all books (particularly in the 
humanities) were imported from Hoxha’s Albania.”100  “Given Albania’s different 
ideological bent, these texts necessarily included ideological and philosophical 
undercurrents contrary to those produced in Yugoslavia.”101  In addition to the university, 
institutes of Albanian literature and culture were opened.  With the removal of police 
pressure and unprecedented progress in education and the development of culture and 
sciences, Kosovo Albanians became more aware of their rights and distinctive culture.  
“The floodgates were now opened to a powerful revival of Albanian nationalism.”102 
                                                 
98 Mertus, 162.  
99 Lazar Nikolic, ”Ethnic Prejudices and Discrimination: The Case of Kosovo,” in Understanding the War in 
Kosovo, eds. Florian Bieber and Zidas Dakalovski, (Frank Cass, 2003), 53-76.   
100 Ibidem.  
101 Mertus, 28. 
102 Vickers, 165.  
33 
In 1974, the new Yugoslav Constitution was promulgated to ease the 
consequences of the outburst of Croatian nationalism that was ruthlessly suppressed by 
the central authorities.  Kosovo was granted the highest degree of autonomy and became 
almost equal to the other republics in Yugoslavia.  Although Kosovo continued to bear 
the title of an Autonomous Province, it had all the institutions of a republican status, such 
as a central bank, supreme court, a separate police force and its own assembly.  The 
educational and judicial systems, as well as healthcare, were placed under then auspices 
of the Province.  Kosovo was represented in the Federal Chamber of the Yugoslav 
Assembly along with seven other federal units.  In addition, Kosovo was authorized to 
adopt its own Constitution.  The 1974 Constitution forbade the Republic of Serbia to 
intervene in Kosovo’s provincial affairs against the will of its assembly.  Nevertheless, 
the Province was denied the right to secede from the federation and Albanians were 
defined as a nationality but not as a nation, and therefore, were not entitled to form a 
republic.  Approximately, at the same time, the pejorative Serbian term “Siptari” for 
Albanians deriving from “Shqiptar” (the name used by Albanians), was forbidden.  Since 
the term Albanians was used in the language of the Constitution, it came into popular 
usage.  Even though local power was mostly under the control of the Albanian members 
of the CPY, ordinary Albanians considered these party members to be Serbian 
collaborators.  
The development of autonomy in the 1960’s and 1970’s did not completely 
satisfy Kosovo Albanians despite tremendous achievements in economical, cultural and 
socio-political spheres.  “By 1978, electricity and running water was available to all but 
remote villages, 57 percent of Kosovo’s population was urban, average life expectancy 
had risen to sixty-eight years, 95 percent of all children were receiving elementary 
schooling, and there was one doctor per 2,009 inhabitants (compare with one per 8,527 in 
1952).”103  The number of Kosovo Albanians employed in the social sector steadily grew 
from 58.2 percent in 1974 to 83 percent in 1978 and to 92 percent in 1980104.  “By 1981,  
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Albanians made up approximately two-thirds of the League of Communists in Kosovo 
and three-forth of the police.”105  That same year, a Kosovo Albanian, Fadil Hoxha, was 
elected Vice-President of the State Presidency, and effectively became Tito’s deputy.   
By the beginning of the 1970’s, the Albanian cultural and historical heritage in the 
form of printed books, radio and TV broadcasts started to become more and more 
observable in Kosovo.  The Pristina Radio and Television Center (RTV) “broadcast for 
ten hours a day in the Albanian language and the two RTV radio channels broadcast 
altogether for thirty-four hours a day”.106  “Albanian intellectuals were eager to discover 
their history and culture, and as a result, played a vital part in encouraging Albanians to 
rediscover their national identity by studying their history, literature and traditions at the 
new Albanology faculty of Pristina University.”107  Numerous Albanian students 
received an opportunity to study abroad including at theology faculties in the Muslim 
Arab World.  For instance, Ibrahim Rugova, the current President of Kosovo, studied 
literature in France, Hashim Taci, the head of the Democratic Party of Kosovo, and 
former political leader of the Kosovo Liberation Army (the KLA), studied political 
sciences in Switzerland.  These also had unexpected results.  As they became 
emancipated, Albanians came to realize that they constitute a nation that was divided not 
only within the federation between Serbia, Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro but also 
between Yugoslavia and Albania.  Thus, Kosovo Albanians became less loyal to the 
Yugoslav Federation and claims that the Province should be granted the status of a 
republic started to appear more often.   
Another reason for the significant increase in the Albanian’s discontent was 
massive unemployment in the Province, “which rose from 18.5 percent in 1971 to 27.5 
percent ten years later”108, and was the highest in Yugoslavia.  “Only one person out of 
ten was wage-earner.”109  Discrepancies between the rate in population and employment  
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only exacerbated the high tensions between Serbs and Albanians.  The Serbs continued to 
occupy many of the managerial positions in professions, not to mention their 
overwhelming majority in the SDB and the Armed Forces.    
“Kosovo’s Albanians had the highest natural population growth-rate in Europe: 
26.1 per 1,000 in 1979 compared with 8.6 for the Yugoslav national average.”110  
Therefore, youths constituted the majority of the population in the region.  A large 
number of youths was involved in the higher education system, which was the way to 
keep them off the streets and to hide the high rate of unemployment among them.  
“Kosovo’s ratio of students was the highest in the country: 274.7 per 1,000 inhabitants, 
compared with the Yugoslav national average was 194.9.”111  “Pristina University 
specialized almost exclusively in Albanian history, literature and arts, while training in 
modern technical disciplines was neglected.”112  In addition, a large number of Albanian 
speaking students gravitated to non-technical sciences.  For instance, a young specialist 
with a degree in Albanology or simply having degree in Albanian language had a slim 
chance of obtaining a job in the Province or in the rest of the country. 
Kosovo was trapped in poverty because it served as a source of raw materials for 
the country’s industrial complex, while the industrial sector in the Province was largely 
underdeveloped.  The constant failure in economic development promoted the creation of 
popular opinion amongst Albanians that had they managed the economy on their own, 
they might have achieved greater success.  The gap between the more developed federal 
units and the less developed was growing increasingly during the post World War II 
period.  In 1947, the level of development of the more developed parts of Yugoslavia was 
twice as high as that in Kosovo.  In 1980, the level of economic development for 
Yugoslavia as a whole, including far from being as prosperous as Macedonia and 
Montenegro, was four times Kosovo’s.113  By 1985, the investment rate in Kosovo was 
the highest in Yugoslavia and had reached 39.56 percent out of the total distribution of 
the Federal Credit Fund, according to the program of development of the underdeveloped 
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areas.  By 1990, this ratio reached 53.26 percent114.  However, heavy investments had 
little impact on the quality of the ordinary people’s life in the region and created 
discontent among the population in other parts of the country, particularly in Slovenia 
and Serbia.  Instead of being directed to increasing the labor market, funds were allocated 
to prestigious projects, such as the building of the Boro i Ramiz sport complex, 
monuments dedicated to World War II heroes, and a modern library in Pristina.  
The poor performance of the economy was exacerbated by the migration of highly 
qualified specialists, mainly Serbs, from the province to Serbia proper.  Serbs complained 
that specialists were forced to leave by “discriminatory policies of Kosovo Albanians.  
Albanians contend that the emigration resulted from the loss of privileges they had 
enjoyed and their reluctance to accept the equality of the Albanians.”115  Kosovo 
Albanians blamed the federal government for the economic failure while the Serbs 
accused incompetent Albanian bureaucrats at the provincial level of governance.  
Frustration amongst Serbs and Albanians steadily grew with time and took different 
forms of outrage including violent mass demonstrations and open accusations of each 
other for creating the problems. 
D.  ALBANIAN MOVEMENT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM SUBVERSION 
TO PARALLEL STATE STRUCTURES 
Certainly during Tito’s rule, Yugoslavia became one of the most open Communist 
countries with its population enjoying considerable liberties unimagined in any other part 
of the Soviet block.  However, it remained a Communist state based on Marxism-
Leninism ideology intolerant of any manifestation of discontent to the regime’s political 
order and to its social, cultural and nationality policies.  Due to strong pressure exerted by 
the State Security apparatus from 1946 and onward, the Albanian national movement was 
ill organized and contained to the underground, and for that reason, could not gain strong 
popular support.  In the period of the 1960’s-1980’s, various political organizations of 
Kosovo Albanians were created first under the auspices of the Revolutionary Committee 
for the Liberation of Albanians than under the Kosovo National Movement.  “Although 
these groups may have claimed left-wing, Marxist-Leninist ideology, their ideology was 
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based more on Albanian nationalism, and their goal was republic status for Kosovo 
and/or unification with Albania.”116  A majority of these groups were illegal and 
involved in clandestine activities including the “distributing of leaflets calling on 
Albanians to take part in boycotts and strikes, of writing ‘subversive slogans’ (such as 
‘Kosovo Republic’) and of distributing ‘subversive literature’ (originating in Albanian or 
Albanian émigré circles)”117.  “Investigation into their activities revealed eight additional 
secessionists groups that employed or were planning to employ terrorism to drive non-
Albanians from Kosovo.”118  
In March 1981, Albanian students of the University of Pristina began to 
demonstrate because they were dissatisfied with the poor quality of food in the 
University’s cafeteria and demanded an improvement in living conditions in university 
dormitories.  They also demanded “better conditions for Albanians in Kosovo” and even 
called “for Kosovo to become a Republic within Yugoslavia”119.  The police easily 
dispersed the student riots using batons and tear gas.  However, in less than two weeks, 
Kosovo was engulfed in mass riots of Kosovo Albanians.  “[T]he student demonstrators 
were joined by factory workers, farmers and, as was later disclosed, several members of 
the League of Communists of Kosovo and Albanian members of the army and police.”120  
The demonstrators protested under the slogans of “Kosovo Republic,” “Protect the Rights 
of Albanians Outside Kosovo,” “Stop Repression, Free Political Prisoners,” “Down with 
the Great-Serbia Chauvinism.”121  Some slogans had a pro-Albanian and anti-Yugoslav 
stance, such as: “We Are Enver Hohxa’s Soldiers,” “Down with Revisionism, Long Live 
Marxism-Leninism,” “We Are Albanians, Not Yugoslavs,” and “We Want United 
Albania!”122 
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Eventually, riots turned violent because of the large numbers of Albanian youth 
involved in disturbances.  According to Sami Repishti, an author of “Human Rights and 
the Albanian Nationality”, “these activities included defacing government buildings, 
desecrating communist monuments and Serbian cemeteries, writing slogans on walls, 
throwing stones at passing trains and government cars, and especially distributing 
antigovernment material”123.  The turmoil caught both federal government and Kosovo 
Albanian leadership by surprise.  In 1995, Mahmud Bakali, the former head of the 
League of Communists of Kosovo, said: “The demonstrations were our handicap.  They 
were not needed at that time”124.  “Azem Vlasi, an Albanian politician who would appear 
close to Milosevic until 1989, would agree, ‘We weren’t ready.  The 1981 demonstrations 
did more harm than good.’”125 
The federal government responded to the riots by declaring a state of emergency 
and undertook harsh measures to quell the disturbances.  The special units of the JNA and 
police were deployed throughout the Province, a curfew was imposed, and several waves 
of arrests were conducted.  Excessive force used by the military and police left “8 
demonstrators dead and another 75 wounded; 55 of these sustained injuries from 
firearms”126.  “Up to 30,000 troops patrolled the Province, which the Albanian 
population viewed as a military occupation.”127  Furthermore, the riots provided the 
federal government the pretext to heighten security measures in the Province.  As a result, 
Kosovo Albanians became subject to police discriminatory arrests and detentions for 
years to come.   
In 1988, Rahman Morina, Kosovo’s minister of interior, presented to the 
Kosovo parliament a report that stated that in the period between 1981 and 
1989 the police and courts had dealt with almost 600,000 people (nearly a 
third of Kosov’s entire population) as a part of the struggle against 
Albanian nationalism.  Of this number, 22,000 were sentenced to between 
2 and 14 years’ imprisonment under Articles 114 and 133 of the Crime 
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Code, which pertained to crimes of opinion.  The charges were prosecuted 
with cooperation of the Kosovo Albanian communist establishment…  
They were supported in this by a predominantly Albanian local police 
force.128   
By the end of 1980’s, the communist regime in Yugoslavia had failed to deliver 
its promises of the creation of a prosperous socialist society with equality for all nations 
and nationalities.  Widespread popular discontent over poor economical performance, 
decreasing living standards, growing tensions between the federal government in 
Belgrade, and the inability to govern the federation and republican authorities efficiently, 
led the latter to initiate political and social changes at the local level.  The strategies of 
the political leadership in each of the Yugoslav republics were largely influenced by 
specific elements of the national question.  The conservative elites in Serbia, headed by 
Slobodan Milosevic, pressed for the unification of Serbia through a considerable 
reduction of autonomy of its Provinces and the concentration of the legislative, executive 
and judicial powers under the authority of the Socialist Republic of Serbia.   
“The first step towards legal unification of Serbia was the adaptation of the 
Programme for the Attainment of Peace, Freedom, Equality and Prosperity in Kosovo by 
the still socialist Serbian Assembly (March 1990).”129  The Programme announced 
“specific measures for preserving law and order, peace, freedom, equality and Serbia’s 
integrity”130.  In addition, the Serbian legislature passed the Law on Actions of the 
Republican Administration in Exceptional Circumstances, which effectively extended the 
emergency measures in Kosovo.  “Using this law as a legal shield, the Serbian 
government replaced the entire ruling Albanian political and managerial elite with 
Kosovo Serbs.”131  The Albanian workers were required to sign letters of loyalty 
declaring their allegiance to the Republic of Serbia.  If they refused, they would be 
expelled from their jobs.  As a result, more than 100,000 Albanians132 were dismissed 
from their positions.  The school’s curricula were adjusted to those of the rest of the 
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republic.  All aspects of the educational system specific to the province were revoked.  
Albanians refused to adopt a new or “Serbinized” curricula, and because education was 
paid by the government, the Serbian authorities simply stop funding to Albanian schools.  
In addition, the Kosovo Academy of Science and Arts, the Kosovo Institute of History 
and faculty of Albanology, were closed down.  “500,000 pupils and university students of 
Albanian nationality were thrown out of the educational system.”133  Eighteen thousand 
teaching and non-teaching staff134 were dismissed by the authorities under different 
pretexts.  
In response to Serbia’s growing involvement in Kosovo internal affairs, the 
Albanian members of the Kosovo Assembly proclaimed the sovereign Republic of 
Kosova within the Yugoslav federation and its secession from Serbia.  In September, they 
held a secret meeting to adopt the so-called Kacanik Constitution of the Republic of 
Kosova.  Therefore, the foundation for the creation of parallel state structures was laid.  
The actions taken by the Kosovo Albanians were considered illegal by the Serbian 
authorities.  Serbia dissolved Kosovo’s government and established direct rule over the 
Province from Belgrade.  Legislative power was delegated to Serbia’s National 
Assembly; executive and administrative power to the Government of Serbia and judicial 
power went under the control of the Supreme Court of Serbia.  Thus, the Province was 
effectively stripped of its autonomy.  The final status of Kosovo was defined as a region 
with territorial autonomy within the Serbian Republic by the new Serbian constitution 
adopted on 28 September 1990.  The province was also given its original name of 
Kosovo and Metohija. 
In September 1991, Kosovo Albanians held a clandestine referendum at which 
“99.87 percent were in favor of independence”135.  In December, the Kosovo Albanian 
leadership applied for recognition as an independent state to the European Community, 
but the request was rejected.  In May 1992, the Kosovo Albanians held parliamentary and 
presidential elections.  Although the elections were deemed illegal by the Serbian  
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authorities, they did nothing to prevent it.  Ibrahim Rugova, a leader of the Democratic 
Alliance of Kosovo (LDK), was elected president by more than 95 percent of the votes 
and his party won 99.5 percent of the votes136.   
Although the ultimate goal of the Albanians was the independence of Kosovo, 
under the leadership of the LDK, they adopted a stance of passive resistance to 
Belgrade’s rule.  While insisting on peaceful resistance, the Albanians denied the 
legitimacy of Yugoslav/Serbian state institutions and refused to compromise with the 
central authority.  The civil disobedience of the Albanians took different forms.  They 
boycotted any elections held in Serbia, refused Serbian administration in the Province, 
stop paying taxes and even did not pay for utilities including garbage collection.  “A sort 
of inverted apartheid had developed in which oppressed, rather than ‘master’ refused to 
cooperate with the other side.”137  In the period from 1992 to 1996, a parallel state 
structure with a functioning presidency, government, legislature and educational and 
healthcare systems were established.  For the first time, the Albanian movement under 
the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova, assumed an organized form and employed civilized 
means of political struggle.  Even though it restrained itself from the violence peculiar to 
the 1980’s and helped to keep the fragile peaceful co-existence in the Province well into 
the mid-1990’s, the Albanian tactics had several major shortfalls.    
At the domestic level, the establishment of a parallel administration eventually led 
to deeper segregation and strengthened mistrust between the two communities.  The 
Serbs controlled the Kosovo administration and state enterprises while the Albanians 
managed their own society and private sector.  Both peoples had their own schools, shops 
and medical facilities.  Although “[t]hroughout the Yugoslav period, the two ethnic 
groups lived separate communal existence and there was almost no intermarriage or other 
significant intercommunal integration”138, with the establishment of parallel state 
structures, practically all interactions between the two communities came to a halt.  In 
addition, the central government, consumed with the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia, 
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simply ignored the Albanian “phantom state” as long as peace and a sort of stability were 
maintained.  “By the renouncing democratic means of political struggle, they [the 
Albanians] were left with options reflecting a strong communitarian bias, promoting 
collective Albanian rights instead of the individual rights of all Kosovars, irrespective of 
their ethnic background.”139 
At the international level, the Albanians could gain only symbolic support and 
sympathy from western powers.  In fact, the international community by and large 
ignored the plight of Kosovo Albanians for the reason that its attention was mostly 
concerned by the situation in Croatia and Bosnia.  The main efforts were put into 
stopping the fighting and facilitating the peace process.  As a result, the question of 
Kosovo was not on the agenda at the Dayton peace conference.  These, in turn, led to the 
radicalization of some segments within the Kosovo Albanian society despite the fact that 
Rugova continued to insist on non-violent tactics, because according to his beliefs, and 
examples from Bosnia:  
The Serbs only wait for a pretext to attack the Albanian population and 
wipe it out. We believe that it is better to do nothing and stay alive than be 
massacred140.   
The small results produced by the pacifist tactics made the emergence of such 
radical groups as the KLA possible.  In addition, the turmoil in Albania that led to the 
collapse of the government in 1997, made the influx of a large amount of weapons and 
ammunition into Kosovo possible as well.  With the stalemate in the political process and 
“with 12 Kalashnikov rifles available for a pair of Nike sneakers”141, the highly probable 
outburst of violence became unavoidable.   
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IV. ON THE WAY TO AN “INEVITABLE” WAR 
Samo sloga Srbina spasava (Solely solidarity saves the Serbs)142 
A. “YOU USED TO WARM US LIKE THE SUN”143 
From the end of World War II and onward, Yugoslavia as a federative state, was 
held together by the Communist Party and authoritarian rule of its charismatic leader 
Josip Broz Tito until his death in 1980.  For many years, Yugoslavia successfully 
functioned as a non nation-state by providing a peaceful compromise to the conflicting 
and complicated “national questions” posed by its constitutive nations and various 
nationalities.  Ever since the foundation of Yugoslavia, whether it was a royalist 
dictatorship during the interwar period or a Communist authoritarian regime after World 
War II, two contradictory forces significantly impacted the shaping of the country’s 
political arrangement, which was namely Croatian, Slovene and Albanian separatism 
striving for their own independent states, and Serbian centralism eager to preserve a 
common state under its authority.  Furthermore, Yugoslavia could not become a nation-
state because the Serbs, the largest ethnic group distributed unevenly throughout the 
country, constituted only 40% of the total population.  Post World War II Yugoslavia 
became rather a conglomerate of federative units that were, in fact, nation-states.   
Despite its internationalist rhetoric, Tito’s communism was deeply nationalistic 
aiming at creating an overarching Yugoslavian consciousness.  Employing “the classic 
Soviet formula, ‘national in form, socialist in content’”144 the communist regime was, in 
effect, a populist movement justified in terms of the unity of the nation.  While balancing 
the various Yugoslav nations against each other to ensure that no national group would 
dominate others, Tito legitimized the communist regime in Yugoslavia through 
nationalism.   
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The Yugoslav political arrangement was developed to accommodate the 
differences amongst its peoples under the leadership of the League of Communists of 
Yugoslavia and Tito in particular.  Tito created the system of checks and balances in 
which any attempt to resolve the national question in favor of a particular ethic group 
would upset the Yugoslavia’s internal balance of power and ultimately lead to the 
collapse of the entire state.  In doing so, Tito played the role of an indispensable arbiter 
among the quarrelling Yugoslav peoples.  Thus, his personal position of charismatic 
authority was absolutely invulnerable to any challenge.   
However, the regime’s efforts to suppress nationalism in order to create Yugoslav 
consciousness ended in vain.  The communist beliefs that ethnic, religious and other 
primordial loyalties would disappear during a process of modernization of Yugoslav 
society were premature.  “[D]espite the unflagging efforts of central authorities to foster a 
spirit of Yugoslavism, no more than 10 per cent of the population ever did call itself 
Yugoslav.”145 The policies and constitutional changes of the federal government led to 
what they sought to avoid, the rise of ethic nationalism, the emergence of various 
secessionist movements and the independence of republics from Yugoslavia.  The 
shortfalls of the Yugoslav system became especially evident after the death of Tito in 
1980 in the wider context of the political transformation of Eastern and Central Europe, 
when nationalistically driven elites became involved in projects for the creation of a 
“Greater Serbia”, “Greater Croatia” and “Greater Albania”. 
B. ORIGINS OF SERBIAN NATIONALISM 
The recent parliamentary elections in Serbia and Montenegro held in December 
2003 to the surprise of many European political and diplomatic observers brought 
unexpected results.  The ultranationalist Serbian Radical Party of Vojislav Seselj, who is 
currently on trial by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) in The Hague for the atrocities committed during the war in Croatia and Bosnia, 
won nearly 28% of the votes and some 82 of 250 seats146.  Additionally, the Serbian 
Socialist Party headed by the former Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, who is also 
es Against Humanity, gained 22 seats in the Parliament.  on trial by the ICTY for Crim                                                 
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Even though the number of seats received by the two parties is too small to govern the 
country, the results of the elections clearly articulate that nationalism still has an appeal 
amongst the Serbian electorate.  Despite the fact that “nationalism is clearly an extremely 
poor ideology”147 it still plays a significant role in politics in Serbia and it will probably 
remain an influential political force for the immediate future until the Serbs fulfill their 
essential desires for belonging and identity. 
The subject of Serbian nationalism has been a primary theme of abundant studies 
produced by numerous historians and political scientists.  Although the majority of 
research clearly identifies evident connections between the outburst of nationalism in 
Serbia at the end of the 1980’s and the beginning of the 1990’s and the escalation of the 
conflict in Kosovo in 1998-99, Serbian nationalism is nothing new. Ever since the 
creation of the autonomous Serbian principality within the Ottoman Empire in 1830, 
nationalism has played a significant role in the formation of the Serbian nation, and 
consequently, the nation-state.  The rise of Serbian nationalism and the progress of the 
demand for an independent Serbian nation-state were closely bound to the demise of the 
Ottoman Empire and the rivalry between the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires over 
influence in the region.  The ‘National awakening’ of Serbs, the struggle for political 
independence, and the creation of a relatively homogeneous nation-state were heroic and 
inhumanly cruel, including the violent expulsion and ‘cleansing’ of minorities.  
A nation is often seen as an abstraction because of the imagination of intellectuals 
whose ideas were propagated either by the elite or by nationalists to serve their interests.  
Benedict Anderson defines a nation as “an imagined political community - and imagined 
as both inherently limited and sovereign”148.  Ernst Renan in his description goes as far as 
stating that “a nation is a state of mind, a community that exists as long as it is willed and 
lives in the hearts and minds of is members149.”  A nation could consist of thousands,  
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perhaps millions of members who do not interact with each other, but still because of 
some commonalities, they associate themselves and their counterparts with their own 
nation.    
The Serbian nation was politically and socially constructed as a cultural nation on 
the basis of the Orthodox religion, the Stokavian dialect of the Serbian language 
developed by Vuk Karadzic, and on the “historical rights” of Serbs to possess territories 
that constituted the medieval empire of Stefan Dusan and were lost as a result of the 
Ottoman conquest.  The special role of religion is most evident in Serbia because well up 
until the 19th century, the Serbs expressed not a national identity, but rather an Orthodox 
identity that sharply contrasted with the Muslim Ottomans and Albanians, who 
represented hostile “others”. “Religious self-consciousness gradually transformed into a 
national self-identification in the nineteenth century Balkans, but religion itself reminded 
an important determining element of self-identification.”150  Thus, religious affiliation 
had a significant input in the formation of the ethic identity of the Serbs. 
Initially, Serbian nationalism as a doctrine has evolved and been used for national 
awakening by a group of intellectuals aimed at the creation of a Serbian state.  Serbian 
national ideology was expressed by Serbia’s Minister of Internal Affairs Ilijia Garasanin.  
In his Nacertanije (1844) that consequently would become a program for Serbian 
nationalists both in the 19th and 20th centuries, “Garasanin argued that the frontiers of the 
new Serbian state had to be extended to all areas where Serbs lived and, after Karadzic, 
these frontiers were linguistic.”151  In the 19th century, the Serbian elite employed 
nationalism because of its ability to mobilize the nation to reach a common goal, to 
transcend discrepancies among classes and differences between rural and urban 
populations, and cemented separated regions of what, as a result, became an independent 
Serbian state.  Nationalism provided legitimacy for the ruling classes’ interests to the rest 
of the nation and made the Serbs feel special and superior compared to others.  It was 
especially effective when the interests of the ruling elite corresponded with the 
aspirations of a broad stratum of society. 
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With the establishment of an independent state in 1878, the new goal of 
incorporating territories populated by Serbs and Kosovo, in particular, where the Serbs 
remained subject to Ottoman rule, was established by Serbian authorities.  “The emotions 
generated by the achievement of independence, joined with the general awareness that 
the Serbian national program was far from completed, created an atmosphere of extreme 
national enthusiasm in the state.”152  In a majority of the cases, nationalism could provide 
a person with political, economical, and social profits, or in most extreme cases, it serves 
as a protection from the real or imagined threats to the nation posed by the alien “others”.  
According to the Serbian national ideology, the permanent solution to the Serbian 
national question would be the creation of a “Greater Serbia.”  A unitary state with a 
highly centralized governance, with a developed economy and strong army, would be 
able to accomplish the program of unifying the Serbs in one nation-state.     
The Serbian leadership cultivated the development of national sentiments through 
the highly influential Orthodox Church, the educational system and the press.  The 
growing state bureaucracy, state financed schools and regular army have been the basic 
and most reliable institutions of effective nationalistic propaganda.  “As in the other 
European states, the government through its official institutions worked to strengthen 
national self-consciousness and to prepare the population to make sacrifices for the sake 
of territorial expansion.”153  The Serbian language, geography and history centered on its 
heroic past of a Serbian nation were emphasized in the school’s curriculum with the 
purpose to educate loyal patriotic citizens who would devotedly support the national 
goals of the Serbian state.  
C.  THE SERBS WIN THEIR BATTLES AT WAR, BUT LOSE IN PEACE 
One of the most important characteristics of Serbian nationalism is a strong belief 
that, as a result of historic and political events, they were treated unfairly compared to 
other Yugoslav peoples.  The Serbs were portrayed as a people victimized during their 
quest for a homeland despite their peculiar good virtues when reviewing the history of 
Yugoslavia by nationalists.  Some ultranationalists go as far as defining Serbs as nation 
avs.  As a victor in the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) and the exploited by the other Yugosl                                                 
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state that fought for the Entente during World War I, Serbia was a leading force in the 
creation of the first Yugoslavia.  At that time, Serbia’s main goal was the unification of 
all Serbs in one centralized state.  “Serbia believed that it had the right to speak in the 
name of all Yugoslav peoples and to influence decisively the form of the state in 
conformity with Serbian national interests.”154  However, even though the Serbian 
institution dominated the royalist Yugoslavia, including the ruling Serbian House of 
Karadjordjevic, politically, the state was organized as a federation.      
The Serbs felt aggrieved in Tito’s Yugoslavia even though they were the only 
Balkan allies of the anti-Hitler Coalition, constituted a majority in the Partisan ranks and 
the Communist Party, and suffered the most casualties during World War II, including 
those inflicted by the other Yugoslav peoples.  As Miranda Vickers points out: “The 
raison d’être of the Yugoslav communists was a carefully set balance of power among 
the peoples and minorities of Yugoslavia over a potential threat of Serbian 
predominance.”155  For instance, on the eve of World War II, 161 of 165 Yugoslav 
generals were Serbs, the Serbs held all 13 positions in the Office of the Premier, 30 of 31 
in the Royal Court, 113 of 127 in the Ministry of the Interior, 180 of 219 in the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, 150 of 156 in the Ministry of Education, and 116 of 137 in the Justice 
Ministry.156, Tito’s regime sought ways to marginalize Serbian influence by using 
interwar Yugoslavia as an example in which Serbian domination in high profile positions 
planted the seeds of discontent among other peoples that eventually led to the dissolution 
of the state during the war.  Moreover, during Communist rule, any manifestation of 
Serbian discontent with national policies of the LCY would be immediately stigmatized 
as a demonstration of Greater Serbian chauvinism.  
The postwar political arrangement of the state served as an additional basis for 
Serbian resentment.  On the one hand, Serbia was the largest republic in the country both 
in terms of territory and population.  The Serbian capital, Belgrade, was also the capital 
of federal Yugoslavia.  On the other hand, even though the PFRY was governed by a 
highly centralized and hierarchical LCY, nonetheless, it remained a federative state.  
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Serbs had the largest diaspora scattered practically throughout all the federative units. 
The former U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmermann, who cannot be 
accused of being sympathetic to Serbian nationalists, in his memoirs pointed out that 
Serbs “had a real grievance against Tito, in some measure justified, for creating a postwar 
Yugoslavia that denied them a role that they believed their large population and historical 
mission entitled them”157.   
The fact the Serbia was the only one of the country’s republics that had two 
autonomous areas established on its territory in recognition of the large minorities in 
Kosovo and Vojvodina, while the Serbian minority in Croatia and Bosnia were denied the 
same status, added more fuel to Serbian resentment.  As previously mentioned in Chapter 
III, the Constitution of 1974 granted the republics and the autonomous provinces 
extended powers of self-government.  “Power under 1974 Constitution is further 
decentralized from the federal to the republic level.”158 
Kosovo gained federal status and de facto became a republic in all aspects except 
for the right of self-determination.  The most dramatic changes brought by the 
constitution to the political arena in the Serbian Socialist Republic was Kosovo’s power 
to veto Serbian Republic initiatives while Serbia could not veto the initiatives of its 
autonomy.  The Serbian Republic effectively lost control over the Province even though 
technically it remained a part of its territory.  Hence, the Serbs in Kosovo felt 
discriminated against as a minority and were denied support and protection from Serbia.  
The Serbs found themselves in the situation that they were divided not only within 
Yugoslavia, but within Serbia as well.  Thus, it created a greater division of the Serbian 
nation and weakened Serbia’s statehood.   
The 1974 Constitution caused ‘positive discrimination’ in favour of the 
Albanians in Kosovo: bilingualism became a condition for employment; 
four-fifths of the available posts were reserved for Albanians on a parity 
basis… Thus begun the virtual Albanianisation of public life in 
Kosovo.159   
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The communist regime began to promote a significant number of Albanians into 
positions of political authority.  The predominantly Albanian provincial authorities 
started a policy of Albanization, which was harshly criticized by the local Serb 
population.  “A quota system limited Montenegrins and Serbs - 20,9 per cent of the 
province’s population in 1971 - to 20 per cent of the jobs.”160  That means that regardless 
of the applicant’s qualifications and abilities, a Serb could occupy only one out of five 
jobs in the public sector.  The same discriminatory principle was applied at Pristina 
University.  In fact, starting from 1974 until 1980, the number of Serbian employees in 
the public sector declined from 31% to 9.3% to 5%161.  In a matter of six years, Serbs 
went from an overwhelming majority to a meager minority in all provincial institutions 
including local administration, the justice system and the police.   
Certainly, the lack of employment opportunities, the tendency of media sources to 
increasingly broadcast and publish information in the Albanian language, the decline of 
the Serbo-Croat culture and education in the Province eventually led to the beginning of 
another migration of Slavs out of the autonomy.  “The net emigration of Slavs from 
Kosovo in the decade 1971-81 was calculated at 102,000, which only served to reinforce 
a Serbian nationalist backlash.”162  Apart from economical and cultural reasons, another 
factor contributed significantly to the Slav migration which was insecurity accompanied 
by the physical and psychological pressure exerted by the Kosovo Albanians on the 
Serbs.  Given the background of the gradual Albanization of the provincial institutions 
and the high birth rate of the Albanian population, the Serbs feared that they were being 
demographically dominated.  They began to fear for their safety and to be marginalized 
by Albanians in the future.   
The Serbian complaints usually included intimidation, robbery, theft of livestock, 
forced sales of homes below the market price and the unwillingness of the predominantly 
Albanian police and authorities to conduct investigations in a proper manner and 
prosecute perpetrators.  “The air was thick with claims of intimidation of the Serbian and 
Montenegrin population by the local police, forced sales of property by Serbs, and even 
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systematic rape of Serbian women as an instrument of ethnic repression.”163  Although 
the majority of these accusations were not fully substantiated, two factors must be noted.  
First, in the decade of 1971-81 “of a total of 605 murders committed in Kosovo, Serbs 
were the victims of 503”164.  Second, an ethnic Albanian, Fadil Hoxha, a member of the 
Yugoslav Presidency admitted “there was undeniable evidence in the province of both 
‘overt and covert’ forms of pressure on Serbs and Montenegrins to leave”165.    
Under the provisions of the Constitution of 1974, the Kosovo Albanians had 
obtained substantial economic, religious, political, and educational rights, not to mention 
that they had more freedoms and opportunities than Albanians in Albania.  However, this 
was not sufficient to make them feel equal to other Yugoslav nations mostly because 
Kosovo Albanians were considered ineligible for republican status.  This was one of the 
chief factors that contributed to the outburst of Albanian nationalism and separatism of 
the 1980’s starting with violent riots in 1981.  Even though a majority of Kosovo 
Albanians were involved in demonstrations demanding further political and economic 
concessions from the federative government, apparently some were drawn to criminal 
activity against local Serbs.   
This time, Serbs and Montenegrin citizens were beaten, their homes and 
businesses were burned, and their shops were looted. Kosovo’s Serb 
population were now seriously alarmed.166   
The Serbs were subject to various forms of pressure including physical assault on 
farmers and Orthodox priests and nuns, desecration of Serbian graves, and defacement of 
Orthodox Church property including the infamous arson of the Pec Patriarchate.  “The 
number of reported cases of Albanian nationalism and separatism grew 22-fold between 
1981 and 1988.”167  “While not agreeing with all accusations, even today’s leader of 
Albanians in Kosovo Ibrahim Rugova, has admitted that Albanians did not behave as 
they should have and that some people were out of control during this period.”168   
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However, one of the major implications as well as unintended consequences of 
the outburst of Albanian nationalism in the decade of 1980-90 was the backlash of 
Serbian nationalism.  The most negative feature of nationalism is that a national 
movement that preaches its values and abilities usually bluntly breaches the rights of 
other nations with a tremendous level of violence.  Nationalism in all of its 
manifestations inevitably leads to a conflict.   
D. BACKLASH OF SERBIAN NATIONALISM AND THE RISE OF 
MILOSEVIC TO POWER 
Modern Serbian nationalism, often wrongly associated with the personality of the 
former Yugoslavian president Slobodan Milosevic, had began to take its destructive 
shape by the 1987 as a result of the decline of the Communist regime, the growing 
weakness of federal government, and the failure of the self-management economy.  By 
1983, Yugoslavia accumulated a foreign debt of 20 billion USD and the interest 
repayments alone constituted 5 billion USD annually169.   
For the first time, the Serbian population in Kosovo expressed their discontent 
over the situation in the province by signing a petition emphasizing Albanian nationalism 
and separatism on 15 January 1986.  Later that year, the draft Memorandum of the 
Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts signed by leading Serbian intellectuals was leaked 
to the press.  “The Serbian Academy of Sciences spoke of ‘[t]he physical political legal 
and cultural genocide of the Serbian population in Kosovo’ and Serbian nationalists felt 
that Kosovo, ‘this most Serbian of lands,[was becoming] the least Serbian.”170  The Serbs 
become easily susceptible to nationalistic ideas and willingly embraced nationalisms 
because of the impact of significant political, economic or social changes on Yugoslav 
society.   
In the case of Serbia, the role of nationalistic propaganda and influence of 
intellectuals and the national elite on national consciousness was immense.  The 
Memorandum heavily criticized the 1974 constitution, articulated that under the 
Federation, the Serbian nation became divided, it acknowledged the deteriorating plight 
of the Serbian minority in Kosovo and called for an immediate reduction in the autonomy 
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of the province.  “In this context, Albanian dominated Kosovo was seen as ‘a cancerous 
wound on the healthy body of Serbia, an area infected by the disease of Shqiptarism 
[Albanism], and the symbol of a betrayal of Serbian national interests.’”171  The 
atmosphere in the society evolved into nationalist hysteria.  “The Serbian leadership felt 
that an expansionist national ideology similar to those of the nineteenth century would 
yield the same results they did then.”172  Serbian mass demonstrations took place in 
different cities throughout Yugoslavia as “rallies for truth”.  At the end of October 1987, 
the Federal riot police, together with army units, were deployed to Kosovo following 
demonstrations by thousands of Serbs.   
On 4 June 1987, Slobodan Milosevic denounced the Memorandum arguing that 
the document is “nothing else but the darkest nationalism”173.  However, in his pursuit 
for power in competition with the Serbian president Ivan Stambolic, Milosevic made a 
tremendous shift towards Serbian nationalism.  Milosevic  
did not invent the national project that he was to use so efficiently; 
Serbia’s intelligentsia had furnished it ready-made. All he did was turn it 
into bellicose slogans.174  
Slobodan Milosevic, being an ordinary Party apparatchik, eventually became a 
political entrepreneur.  Although originally he was in a modest position and largely 
condemned extreme nationalists within Serbian society in his conquest for political office 
and power, he hijacked the nationalist agenda and used it for his own personal gains.   
Milosevic did not invent Serbian nationalism but he seized the real or imagined 
grievances of Kosovo Serbs in his quest for political office.  He realized that the support 
of Serbs over the Kosovo issue could help him gain control over the Serbian League of 
Communists, and consequently, over the country.  The conflict between Serbs and 
Albanians was given a new definition in that it was now considered an ethic issue.  
Milosevic decided to assume the role of a national leader and protector of the Serbs in the 
province.  Being a member of ideologues and the opportunistic elite, Milosevic used its 
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program “[that] usually include identifying internal scapegoats (often minorities) 
responsible for the nation’s problems, exaggerating external threats, and calling for the 
mobilization and centralization of resources to do battle against the nation’s internal and 
external enemies”175.  
Milosevic won absolute public support by promising strong leadership in times of 
economic difficulties and social unrest that brought about the disintegration of the state.  
Exploiting the issue of Kosovo, he managed to crush any opposition to his takeover of the 
Communist Party.  Given that, most Serbs, both within Serbia and Kosovo, would hardly 
accept the secession of Kosovo.  Milosevic capitalized this sentiment using the issue of 
Kosovo to achieve his own political ambitions.  For many Serbs, he was a new type of 
Communist leader who emphasized the ideas of Serbian statehood and the unity of a 
Serbian nation over the tenets of Marxism.  “By shifting the political debate from 
ideology to the Serbian national interest Milosevic destroyed the prospect of Serbia’s 
transition to democracy.”176  The increase of Serbian nationalism skillfully masterminded 
and exploited by Milosevic triggered a rise in the various competitive nationalistic 
movements throughout Yugoslavia. 
It may sound cynical and may make no sense to some observers, but Milosevic’s 
rise to power in Yugoslavia would not have become possible without the actions, or 
rather inactions, of the Kosovo Albanians profoundly influenced by its leadership.  “The 
political elite on each side understand each other perfectly well - only their immediate 
and long-term agendas directly conflict.”177  Both Milosevic and Rugova needed each 
other in order to push further their own agendas.  Both exploited grievances already 
existing in the general populace and manipulated the national consciousness of their 
people respectively to stay in power.  “Serbian and Albanian leaders have used 
nationalism as a theory of political legitimacy to justify the political reality.”178     
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Ibrahim Rugova is often praised for his Gandhian style of non-violent resistance 
to Serbian authority.  These tactics derived from the assumption that violence would be 
too costly and would negatively affect the Albanians more than the Serbs.  However, the 
Albanian boycott of all Yugoslavian/Serbian elections, including the presidential 
elections of 1990 and 1992 as a part of peaceful resistance, had another side.  Even 
though the multi-party elections of 1990 were considered free, and Rugova might have 
gained considerable power because Kosovo Albanians outnumbered Serbs in the 
province, he still refused to participate.  Rugova received the widespread support of 
Kosovo Albanians because of his uncompromising demand for independence and sharp 
criticism of the Serbian administration.  “He insisted that the Kosovars would never again 
recognize Serbian authority and that he would not last a single day as their leader if he 
brought them into electoral process.”179  
Although according to the Kosovo Albanians’ leadership rhetoric, participation in 
the presidential elections would mean that they recognize “the Serbian rule over their 
homeland”180 and “Milosevic would manufacture the votes he needed in the same way as 
his regime printed as much money as needed”181, the participation of Albanians in 
elections could help to remove Milosevic from power.   
The million Albanian votes could undoubtedly have ousted Milosevic, but 
as the Kosovar leadership admitted at that time, they did not want him to 
go. Unless Serbia continued to be labeled as profoundly evil - and they 
themselves, by virtue of being anti-Serb, as good guys - they were unlikely 
to achieve their goals. It would be a disaster for them if a peacemaker like 
Panic had restored human rights, since that would have left them with 
nothing but a bare political agenda to change borders.182  
Milosevic came to power on the wave of growing Serbian nationalistic sentiment 
and managed to stay in office for a decade despite the humiliating defeats in Croatia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina because he mastered nationalism to promote his political 
agenda.  However, by unleashing powerful forces of nationalism he fell into his own trap.  
As a result of his role played during the negotiations in Dayton, Milosevic’s support in 
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Serbia started to decline sharply in favor of opposition leaders.  However, according to 
Senator Biden during his meeting held with opposition leaders, he found out that they 
were more Serbian than Milosevic.  “They were literally, literally, literally critical of 
Milosevic for being too accommodating.”183  In addition, some Serbian radical 
nationalists accused him of betraying the Great Serbian cause and blame him for the 
failure to create a unified Serbdom, or in other words, a betrayal of Serbian national 
interests.  During the presidential elections held in 1997, the leader of the ultranationalist 
Serbian Radical Party, Vojislav Seselj, posed a direct challenge to Milosevic because he 
was close to receiving a majority of the votes184.   
Therefore, any concessions made to Kosovo Albanians would literally mean 
political death to Milosevic.  After compromises made in both Croatia and Bosnia, 
Kosovo became too important to Milosevic’s political career to lose.  His own political 
survival was much more important than finding a peaceful solution to growing inter-
ethnic tensions in Kosovo and its future status.  By the summer of 1989, with a 
significant increase in KLA activity and as a result of a growing number of victims, 
Belgrade’s authority leaned towards a military solution.  According to the former Serbian 
Prime Minister, Mirko Marjanovic, since the beginning of 1998, the KLA conducted 
1,273 terrorist attacks that resulted in 140 civilians dead and 107 wounded, 94 police 
officers killed and 233 wounded, and 249 people kidnapped.185   
During the meeting held between General Wesley Clark and the former Yugoslav 
president Milosevic in October 1998, he tried to convince the former that Belgrade is able 
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…he said you know General Clark… we know how to handle problems 
with these Albanian killers.  I said, well how do you do that?  He said, we 
have done this before, I said when, he said Drenica 1946.  I said how did 
you handle it?  He said we kill them, all of them.  He said it took several 
years but we kill them all.186  
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
The conflict in Kosovo has a long-standing history about two peoples, the Kosovo 
Serbs and Albanians, who have never lived together, but rather, have been living next to 
each other.  In short, the problem derived from the relations between these two peoples 
and their conflicting national identities.  Their contradicting positions developed 
throughout a turbulent and complicated history of the region.  They also have their own 
visions and interpretations of the region’s history that significantly impact their claims 
over the territory of Kosovo and formulate their demands.   
Violence has been the norm rather than the exception in their relationship 
throughout the history of the region.  Domination of one ethic group by the other has 
always characterized the situation in Kosovo.  Whoever, either the Serbs or Albanians, 
gains control over the region, even temporarily as a result of wars or changes in the 
political arrangement of the state, has always tried to eliminate the traces of the presence 
of the other nation by desecration of religious monuments, assault and pillage on 
representatives of the other ethnic group and the forceful movement of the population.  In 
each case, the goal was the demographic transformation of Kosovo.  However, very 
often, the Serbs and Albanians switched their roles from victims to perpetrators and back 
again.       
Both the Serbs and Albanians regard Kosovo as an indispensable trait of their 
national identities and spiritual and cultural centers of their civilizations.  In fierce 
competition to establish control over Kosovo, they joined a protracted conflict lasting 
roughly 130 years that began with the Russo-Turkish war of 1876-1878 when Serbia and 
Montenegro conquered the northern and eastern parts of Kosovo.  On the other hand, 
significant changes in the ethnic distribution and demographic upheaval in favor of 
Albanians caused by the five centuries long Ottoman rule, associated with the gradual 
Islamization and Albanization of the region, was a necessary prerequisite for the conflict.  
Since the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918, all 
successive Yugoslav governments had encountered the most pressing problem of 
“national questions.”  In the perpetual attempt to keep the multinational state united by 
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maintaining ethno-national balance and the suppression of various secessionist 
movements, they were inclined to use forceful means.  Given that the Serbs dominated 
interwar Yugoslavian state institutions and constituted a majority in the Communist party 
and ruling elite in the postwar period, the Albanians always perceived the central 
authority as a mere extension of the Serbian regime.  Therefore, the authoritarian 
character of the government in both royalist and communist Yugoslavia was confused by 
the ethnicity of the oppressor.  
From 1945 onward, the Communist Party and the strong leadership of Marshal 
Josef Broz Tito held Yugoslavia together as a federation.  Despite the Communist 
attempts to propagate Yugoslav national consciousness and create a society based on the 
tenets of Marxism-Leninism, the ethnic, religious and other primordial loyalties did not 
disappear.  On the contrary, since the divisions between the classes in a socialist society 
were minimal or supposed to be minimal and citizens of different ethnic background 
could belong to the same class, the ethnic and religious types of identity prevailed 
nonetheless.   
The post-war policies only exacerbated the nationality question and did little to 
solve it.  Moreover, the balance of power distributed along ethic lines within Kosovo 
evolved over the post World War II period.  Immediately after the war, due to objective 
reasons, the Serbs dominated all provincial institutions including the Party apparatus, 
local administration, justice system and police.  By the beginning of the 1970’s, as a 
result of the process of emancipation of the Kosovo Albanians, they eventually gained 
control over the administration in Kosovo.   
The gradual enhancement of the autonomy of Kosovo during the Tito era added 
more grievances to the complicated relations between the Serbs and Albanians.  Even 
though under the provisions of the Constitution of 1974, the Kosovo Albanians had 
obtained substantial economic, religious, political, and cultural rights and Kosovo 
practically became equal to any other subject of the federation including the right to enter 
into agreements and negotiations with foreign states187, the Albanians were not satisfied 
                                                 
187 According to Article 293 of the Kosovo constitution that autonomy was allowed by the Yugoslav Constitution 
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with their status.  The main reason was that albeit the Province was a republic in all the 
aspects except name, the right of secession from the federation was denied the Kosovo 
Albanians even though it was accorded to any other republic with its constituent nation.  
Thus, the Albanians were not considered equal to other Yugoslav nations.   
The Serbs, in turn, highly criticized the Constitution because according to their 
view, the Albanians not only “enjoyed rights unparalleled by any other minority in the 
world”188, but they did so to the Serbs’ detriment and at their expense.  In addition, as a 
result of the Constitution of 1974, two ethnic groups found themselves in a paradoxical 
situation. While the Serbs constituted a majority within the Socialist Republic of Serbia, 
they represented only a tiny minority in the Autonomous Province of Kosovo, whereas 
the Albanians, being a predominant ethnic group in the region, were considered a 
minority within the SFRY.  The failure of the Communist regime to accommodate 
contradictive national interests and ease the existing tensions in the framework of the 
federation led to the deepening of the economic and cultural divisions between the Serbs 
and the Albanians.  
Widespread discontent over the poor economical performance, decreasing living 
standards and growing unemployment provoked massive violent demonstrations by the 
Albanians throughout Kosovo.  The harsh repressive response of Yugoslav authorities 
stimulated Albanian national sentiments and pressed them to claim territorial sovereignty.  
On the other hand, the outburst of Albanian nationalism in the decade of 1980-90 
fostered the rise of Serbian nationalism. 
The escalation of violence between the Kosovo Albanians and Serbs in 1998-99 
in Kosovo was not inevitable but highly probable considering the animosity that existed 
in the society by the beginning of the 1990’s.  Moreover, the general atmosphere of 
resentment, disillusion over the existing political arrangement of the state, and 
nationalistic propaganda became catalysts for the polarization of Kosovo society along 
ethnic lines.  Political entrepreneurs on both sides magnified the real or imagined 
grievances by reverting to historical memories, myths and emotions, and as a result, 
propelled this process further.  
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The shortfalls of the Yugoslav system became especially evident in the wider 
context of the political transformation of Eastern and Central Europe, when 
nationalistically driven elites reintroduced ancient sources of the conflict and 
instrumentalized ethnic and religious loyalties in favor of their specific political agendas.  
Even though it seems as if the hard core of the conflict in Kosovo is political, economical 
and territorial in nature without the existence of an intrinsic cultural and ethnic 
differences, it would hardly take its devastating form.  
With the absence of democratic institutions able to mediate between competing 
Serbs and Albanians and the declining ability of the federative authorities to maintain 
ethnic peace and stability, the two ethnic groups became amalgamated behind 
nationalistic leaders who promised to promote national interests.  The culture of 
victimization of one’s own ethnic group and demonizing the other’s, the unwillingness of 
both peoples to cooperate with each other, and the readiness of Serbian authorities to 
employ force to solve the growing crisis in Kosovo, triggered the vicious cycle that 
eventually pulled the region into violence.  “It had been predicted that, if there [in 
Yugoslavia] was to be a war, it would break out in Kosovo.”189 
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